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Abstract 
 
In Pipariya, an ethnically mixed village in the Chitwan district of Nepal, young Tharu 
men are migrating for labor to the Arab Gulf countries and Malaysia. Drawing on 
ethnographic fieldwork, this project examines motivations to migrate as well as the 
impact of remittances on the stay-home population. I argue that migration is a strategy 
utilized by Tharu households to pursue upward social mobility in a multi-ethnic context. 
Remittances, as a social agreement and the material outcome of migration, increase the 
family’s income, enabling a reduction in social class differences and the redefinition of 
traditional women’s roles. 
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Chapter 1: The road to migration 
Part 1: Introduction 
“No man is an island” begins a poem written in 1624 by the English poet and 
cleric John Donne. The poem speaks about how by being part of the human race we 
should care equally about every human death. With these words, Donne motivates his 
listeners to overcome social differences. Almost four hundred years later, although 
humans are more interconnected than ever and are less of an "island", inequalities and 
disparities are unfortunately not in decline. Regional differences in economic 
opportunities have pushed people out of less economically advantageous areas and pulled 
them into zones where jobs and services are readily available. The movement of people 
from one place to another in search of better economic and social opportunities happens 
within and outside a country’s borders, seasonally or permanently. The International 
Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that there are around 224 million international 
migrants in the world, and 150 million of them migrate exclusively in search of work 
(ILO 2016). 
While some families or groups of people decide to permanently relocate 
somewhere else, other families decide to send only one member abroad. This person 
maintains a connection to his or her place of origin by sending money—known as 
remittances—back to their relatives. According to the World Bank, $441 billion dollars 
were sent in 2015 by relatives abroad to families all over the developing and the 
developed world (World Bank 2015). While the amount of remittances in net amount of 
dollars might be higher for workers from developed countries, it is in the developing 
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world where remittances have a greater impact (Paerregaard 2014). Even a small amount 
of money sent from abroad can create a great difference for low-income households. 
This ethnography focuses on labor migration and remittances in one specific area 
of the world: Nepal. This country’s relationship with migration and remittances is a long-
term and intricate one, making it a relevant place for the study of these topics. Nepal’s 
Department of Foreign Employment (DOFE) estimates that 2.2 million Nepalis are 
currently working abroad. In 2014 alone, the DOFE issued 512,878 foreign labor permits. 
Remittance money contributed 29.1% of Nepal’s Gross Domestic Product for the 
2013/2014 period and the amount of remittances per household per year is NR40,600—
around $381, (DOFE Report 2014). Migration is an economic strategy for many Nepali 
families, and the impact of remittances is deeply felt by Nepal’s smaller villages as well 
as larger cities. 
Labor migration is by no means a recent phenomenon in the Nepali society. 
Young men have left the country to be part of foreign armies or to work abroad, mainly 
in India, for several generations. What is new, however, is the growth in number of men 
and women who leave the country today. While in 2009 between 700 and 800 workers 
left Nepal every day for destinations other than India (Bruslé 2009), in 2014 the daily 
estimate was 2,000 people (Washington Post 2014). Migrants’ destinations have also 
expanded, as it has become easier for workers to obtain jobs in Asian countries outside of 
the Indian subcontinent. As a result, Nepalis are in constant interaction with foreign 
societies, either personally, or indirectly through a migrant family member. While 
understanding the economic impact of remittances allows us to quantify Nepal's 
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economic development, studying the cultural impact of migration on both the person who 
leaves Nepal and the stay-behind family sheds light on social changes accelerated by the 
transfer of money—and people—between communities of the developing and the 
developed world. 
Nepal is a diverse country, with 125 different caste and ethnic groups, and more 
than 123 nationally recognized languages spoken (CBS 2011). As such, it is problematic 
to generalize what Nepal's cultural practices are. The reality of one particular caste or 
ethnic group might differ greatly from the others. In this ethnography, I do not make 
claims about migration practices and the impact of remittances on the entirety of Nepal. 
Rather, I have focused on one specific group: the Tharu of Chitwan district.  
In this ethnography, I will look at the different motivations for migration among 
the Tharus in the village of Pipariya, in the Tarai lowlands of Nepal, where I conducted 
fieldwork. I argue that labor migration has the capacity of generating upward social 
mobility among Tharu households. In this process of migration, gender roles and class 
hierarchies are altered. I believe it is remittances, the social and material agreement 
between the migrant and the left-behind family, what enables the alteration of traditional 
social structures. 
The questions that guide my initial research are: what is it about the social and 
economic landscape of the village that pushes young Tharus to migrate? And, given that 
labor migration to Gulf countries and Malaysia is the most popular form of migration, 
what are the procedures Tharu people need to follow to engage in this kind of migration? 
Secondly, I will look at the impact of migration on the social landscape. I will focus on 
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three questions: Have remittances been able to alter the ways in which Tharus relate to 
other ethnic and caste groups in Nepal? To what extent have remittances changed gender 
relations and transformed the role of women in the community? And finally, how do 
remittances modify the traditional Tharu social hierarchy?  
In this study, I consider the household to be an indivisible unit, and as such, the 
decision to migrate is in part approved by all its adult members. At the same time, 
because household members fulfill different roles, migration and remittances do not 
impact each person equally. I explain how the migrant himself, generally a son or a 
young husband, decides to migrate in order to contribute to the household income, while 
at the same time expanding his status within the community. Analysis of only migrant 
experiences, however, is incomplete, as it fails to explain the impact on the stay-behind 
household members. Because of the gendered nature of migration, women make up most 
of the stay-behind population. As such, although this ethnography does not focus entirely 
on gender, it does analyze the way in which migration and remittances are currently 
transforming the role of women in Pipariya's society. 
The Tharu are a group particularly situated within Nepal's physical and 
demographic landscape, as the coming chapters will illustrate. My aim is to expand the 
conversation about a population within Nepal that has been largely understudied. This 
ethnography also seeks to explain migratory practices of groups outside of the hill region 
of Nepal—where most of the research on Nepali migration has focused so far. I hope that 
the stories and experiences of these families will help us humanize moving populations, 
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and understand challenges that are common across the experiences of millions of migrant 
workers throughout the world. 
Part 2: Methodology 
During the weeks preceding the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, I encountered an 
article in The Guardian by Robert Booth condemning the death of Nepalis working in the 
construction of Qatar’s stadiums for the 2022 World Cup. The article estimated that by 
2022, 4,000 Nepalis will have died in the construction sites. Unlike the message that John 
Donne conveys in his poem, these workers' lives had little value. They were almost 
invisible. To their employers, they were second-class humans, not worthy of 
implementing safety regulations in the workspace, or receiving any benefits and 
compensations. To the media that portrayed them, these were defenseless individuals, 
manipulated and abused by employers, vulnerable because of their poverty-stricken 
backgrounds. The article, although well researched, maintained a sensationalist tone that 
is much present in all the news articles that describe the situations of Nepalis—and other 
South and South East Asian workers—in the Arab Gulf countries. 
The lack of agency in the way Nepalis were portrayed in these articles motivated 
me to learn more about international labor migration. While in Nepal during the fall of 
2014, I heard countless stories of struggle and also of success from Nepalis not only in 
Qatar, but also in other parts of the Arab world and Asia. In all the villages I visited there 
were several families who had at least one member working abroad. Labor migration is a 
phenomenon that touches almost every Nepali man and woman, whether personally or 
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through a migrating family member. Noticing the prevalence migration had in the daily 
lives of Nepalis, I decided to further investigate the stories of migrants and their families. 
The data on which this ethnography is based was gathered in two different periods 
of fieldwork. First, during the fall of 2014, I spent a total of four months in Nepal. During 
the first three months I had several informal conversations with men who had migrated, 
and with women whose husbands had migrated. These people came from different 
districts, and belonged to different castes and ethnic groups. I also interviewed members 
at a local NGO that helps Nepali migrant workers. Towards the end of my program I 
decided to spend time in a small village in the Chitwan district. I was advised to stay in 
this village because of the large number of its inhabitants who had decided to migrate.  
I also chose this village because its population is split between Tharus—one of 
Nepal's indigenous groups from the Tarai—and Bahuns—high-caste hill people. I was 
interested in learning about migratory practices of Nepal's indigenous groups, as they are 
uniquely situated in Nepal’s diverse society. I was lucky enough to be welcomed into this 
community through a young Tharu entrepreneur. Before beginning my study, I had read 
several studies that focused on the effects of out-migration on either hill caste groups, or 
hill indigenous people. However, migration studies in the Tarai focused mainly on the 
movement of people to India, and no studies have been conducted on migration among 
the Tharu people in general, and the Tharu of Chitwan in particular. My own experience 
in Pipariya demonstrated the importance of shedding light on Tharu international 
migration, as it is a much more common practice than the literature indicates. I lived with 
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a Tharu family in the small village of Pipariya1 for three weeks, where I interviewed 13 
returned migrant workers, 14 women whose husbands had migrated, and four young men 
who were preparing to leave the country. 
In December of 2015, a year after my initial fieldwork, I returned to Nepal thanks 
to the Spradley Summer Research Fund, a generous award from the Anthropology 
Department at Macalester College. I spent one month in Pipariya interviewing a wide 
range of community members: returned migrants, their parents, Bahuns and Tharu non-
migrants, microcredit entities, and educated Bahun and Tharu women. I did this in order 
to get as much of a complex and nuanced perspective as I could in the short period of 
time I spent in the village. In total, between my two fieldwork experiences, I conducted 
more than 50 interviews and 30 surveys, and spent countless hours listening to stories 
from the village and about migration, while sitting around the fire in the cold winter 
nights. I am forever thankful to the community of Pipariya for welcoming me into their 
lives and allowing me to share their stories with the rest of the world. 
Part 3: Road Map 
This ethnography is divided in six chapters. The first one includes this short 
introduction, and the methods I utilized in order to be able to write the ethnography. The 
second chapter will introduce us to the history of the Tharu and of Pipariya, and how it 
came to be the ethnically mixed village it is today. By analyzing internal migration 
practices, we will begin to understand the motivations for international labor migration. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 All names of places and people have been changed to protect the integrity of my informants.  
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The chapter will also discuss the politics of Nepal, and the long-term engagement this 
society has had with labor migration. 
Chapter three analyses the literature on migration and remittances on an 
international level. It focuses first on the economic study of these two phenomena, and 
moves on to discuss their social, political and cultural implications. The chapter will also 
provide examples to begin understanding the pervasive nature of labor migration and the 
impact it has in the sending communities. It will also provide a theoretical framework 
through which we can become closer to the migrants' experiences. I argue that 
remittances as a livelihood strategy, as well as a reciprocal relationship between the 
migrant and the stay-behind family, motivate international movement, uplifting in the 
process the social status of the migrants. 
The fourth chapter describes the motivations to migrate. It begins by analyzing 
employment possibilities at home—or lack thereof—that push young men to leave 
Pipariya. It also analyses push and pull factors of migration in Pipariya, and the necessary 
steps that migrants need to take in order to be employed abroad. It ends by providing a 
view of what "abroad" means to the migrants, and how some of these ideas are 
retransmitted to the home community. Chapter five shifts the perspective away from the 
migrant, and focuses on the changes that take place at home after the young men leave 
and begin remitting money. Social classes and gender relations are two areas where we 
can perceive strong changes in the community due to migration. Remittances have 
impacted the resources that stay-behind women manage, slowly indicating 
 9 
transformations of traditional gender roles. Remittances have also had a positive effect in 
decreasing socio-economic inequalities. 
I conclude this thesis with the hope that labor migration will allow Tharus of 
Pipariya to expand their incomes, while at the same time allowing the space for 
traditionally underprivileged populations to prosper. The changes in gender roles, class, 
and caste dynamics that can already be perceived indicate the dynamic nature of migrant 
populations. 
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Chapter 2: Locating Pipariya 
They arrive every evening at 7:00 pm, with impeccable punctuality. A few of 
them bring chairs, others bring firewood, and a few latecomers will improvise seats with 
dry logs. They set a small fire, and gather around it. For two hours the conversation will 
flow, more participants will arrive, while others leave. Hindi or Nepali songs will play 
from someone’s cell phone. I call them the Brotherhood of the Returned. They are all 
young men from this village in the lowlands of Nepal. They are between 20 and 35 years 
of age, not younger and not older. They have something else in common: they have all 
worked abroad for a period of time, in either the Arab Gulf countries or Malaysia.  
The language of the conversation is generally Tharu, the local language and 
native to most of these young men. Sometimes, a friend of theirs from a different ethnic 
group also attends, in which case the conversation is mixed between Tharu and Nepali. 
The topics of conversations are varied, from town gossips, to adventures in the adjacent 
jungle, and even information from abroad. This last topic is the most popular. They tell 
personal stories about their experiences abroad, how they confused the Arabic word tɑˤl 
(imperative for 'to come') with the Nepali word taal ('plate') and handed a plate from the 
pile they were washing to the Saudi supervisor who was calling them to his office. Other 
times they tell each other about opportunities they know, a job offer as a truck driver in 
Bahrain, or a position in a metal factory in Malaysia, of which they heard from a distant 
cousin. By 9:00 pm, all signs of the meeting will have disappeared. They will quietly put 
the chairs back, put out the fire, and leave. This ritual will recommence the following 
night. 
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Part 1: Understanding the Tarai and the Tharu of Chitwan 
These evening gatherings of the Brotherhood of the Returned take place in 
Pipariya, a small, ethnically mixed village of Chitwan, one of the Inner Tarai valleys of 
Nepal. The Tarai is the geographic region that lies to the south of the foothills of the 
Himalayas, and the northern part of the Indo-Gangetic plain. This region delimits the 
frontier between India and Nepal. In Nepal, the Tarai region is 900 kilometers long and 
covers around 23% of the country’s total area (Guneratne 1994). In certain parts the 
Siwaliks, a range of low-lying hills, diverge from the main mountain range below the 
Himalaya, the Mahabharat, creating valleys or doons such as Chitwan (Guneratne 1994). 
Historically, there is evidence that the Tarai was a region of great importance for the 
development of Buddhism (Trevor and Smythies, cited in Guneratne 1994:68), but this 
importance faded towards the fourth century, and the region became covered in the sal 
forests that characterized it until a few decades ago. 
Pipariya is specifically located in the Chitwan district, which is an important 
region in the country in economic, social and political terms, and which has seen a large 
demographic transformation in the last few decades. The Chitwan district comprises the 
doon valley as well as the adjacent hill areas. This valley is a strategic region, as it 
provides immediate access to the Kathmandu valley from the south. Relatively isolated 
during the nineteenth century, malaria kept people from the Indian plains and the Nepali 
hills from populating the area. Travelers would avoid spending the night in the area, and 
only crossed it during the colder, less mosquito-infested winter months. The Nepali state 
chose to maintain Chitwan as a natural, inaccessible barrier to protect the Kathmandu 
Valley from the rapidly expanding British Raj. 
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Before the eradication of malaria, the Chitwan valley was inhabited by groups 
like the Bote, the Musahar and the Tharus. These groups were marginalized within Nepal 
and had limited contact with the government of Kathmandu. During the first half of the 
20th century, the Chitwan valley used to be the Nepali royalty's hunting grounds. The 
landscape around Pipariya and through most of the valley is flat and subtropical, much 
different from the mountainous terrain of the rest of Nepal. Different species of wild 
animals inhabit the region, including tigers, rhinos, elephants, deer, and crocodiles. 
Pipariya is located almost adjacent to the national park where these animals are currently 
found. During the time of the Rana rulers, large amounts of land were fenced and 
designated as King's property, and were used solely as winter-season hunting areas. The 
local population maintained its relative autonomy and isolation. 
In the 1950s, Nepal's government changed the way it approached the Tarai 
territories. The Inner Tarai valleys became targets of development, considering the 
technical difficulties of developing a modern agricultural system in the hills. The clearing 
of these valleys was expected to alleviate the population of the hills by offering new 
productive farmland (Müller-Böker 1999). In 1955 a motorway was built through the 
Rapti valley and with the help of the government of the United States, a malaria 
eradication program was implemented. In the late 1970s Narayangath, Chitwan’s largest 
town, was linked by road to Nepal’s East-West highway, making it accessible from cities 
all over Nepal and also from India. This decision located Narayangath at the center of the 
country’s transportation system, attracting government services, business investments, 
and jobs. The effects of this development were felt throughout the Chitwan Valley. Over 
time, a regular bus service arose to connect the Valley residents to schools, police 
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stations, health centers, employment, and other public and private resources (Bohra and 
Massey 2009:625). Nowadays, it is even possible to obtain a Master's Degree without 
having to leave the district, and one of Nepal’s most well equipped hospitals is located in 
Chitwan. 
After the eradication of malaria and the development of roads and infrastructure, 
people from Nepal’s hills moved into Chitwan transforming the social structure and 
relationships of the region. These migrant groups included different hill ethnic groups, 
such as Newars, Gurungs, Tamangs, as well as high-caste hill groups like Bahuns and 
Chhetris. These groups are called pahaariyas by the Tharus. Pahaariya means, in Nepali, 
“someone from the pahaar or hills”. This movement of people into the Tarai changed the 
demographics of the area drastically. The following table includes census data from 2011 
regarding the ethnic composition of Chitwan district: 
Table 1 - Ten largest caste/ethnic groups in Chitwan district 
Caste/Ethnic group Number of people Percentage of population 
Brahmin/Bahun 165,625 28.6% 
Chhetri 65,894 11.4% 
Tharu 63,395 10.9% 
Tamang 46,198 7.9% 
Gurung 39,155 6.8% 
Newar 30,256 5.2% 
Kami 28,318 4.9% 
Magar 27,985 4.8% 
Damai/Dholi 12,101 2.1% 
Sarki 7,218 1.2% 
Others 93,839 16.2% 
Total 579,984 100% 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics 2011 
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After the influx of hill migrants, Tharus were confronted with the loss of their 
land and social position to these new comers. According to Guneratne (1994), in 1971 the 
percentage of the population that spoke Tharu in Chitwan was 13.46%. The 2011 Central 
Bureau of Statistics (CBS) census data shows that today 10.1% of the total population of 
the district declares Tharu as their mother tongue. There has been a continuous decline in 
the share of Tharu population, generating a strong sense of resentment towards 
pahariyaas, and social tensions between the Tharu and Bahuns. Animosities between the 
high caste groups and other lower caste and ethnic groups exist not only in Chitwan, but 
also in the rest of the country. 
In the village development committee (VDC) where Pipariya is located, Tharu 
people are still a large percentage of the population. 48% of the households belong to this 
ethnic community. Bahuns represent 28% of the population. The remaining 24% of the 
VDC's population is made up of other groups of hill-migrants as well as low caste and 
untouchable groups (CBS 2011). While Pipariya is predominantly Tharu, the presence of 
Bahuns is also strongly felt. These two main groups live in different parts of the village 
and only interact with each other in particular situations. Interaction is strong between the 
Tharu male elites and the Bahun males. Children and teenagers attend some of the same 
schools, but groups of friends are seldom ethnically mixed. Tharu women interact with 
Bahun women through the local microfinance groups, but these women also prefer to stay 
within their own linguistic communities, where they feel more comfortable. 
Tharu people define themselves as aadivaasi—indigenous inhabitants of the land. 
The main economic activity of the Tharu has always been agriculture and cattle herding. 
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With large amounts of land available for a small population, Tharus never encountered 
the problem of land scarcity. Before a land registration system was implemented by the 
Nepali state, Tharus used to live semi-nomadic lifestyles and practiced shifting 
cultivation (McLean 1999). Immigration, resettlement and land reform policies of the 
1960s changed land availability drastically, and many Tharus, unaware of the monetary 
value of their own fields, sold land at very cheap prices. 
There are also other groups that inhabited Chitwan before the migration from the 
hills. The following table contains information from the Malaria Eradication Program 
about the percentage of Pipariya's population that identified as and indigenous or non-hill 
ethnic group in 1990. 
Table 2 - Indigenous/non-hill ethnic groups in selected Village Development 
Board in Chitwan, 1990-1991 
Ethnic group Total  % of total 
Tharu 3723 93.21 
Bhote 29 0.73 
Musaher 75 1.88 
Kumal 102 2.55 
Darai 65 1.63 
Source: Guneratne (1994:100) 
The table shows that Tharus were the largest community that did not identify as a hill 
migrant. In relationship to these other groups, Tharus have been traditionally more 
powerful, and remain so. Tharus consider the Darai, Musaher, and Kumal to be much 
inferior to themselves (Guneratne 1994:99). 
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After the arrival of hill migrants of higher caste, Tharus came to occupy a middle 
status in the local society. This redefined their understanding of themselves as a group, as 
these newcomers considered Tharus to be backward farmers and people of the jungle—
jangli in Nepali—in relation to the educated, more business oriented Bahuns. Despite the 
fact that the hierarchical differences between these two groups are rooted in the caste 
system, few Tharus regard Bahuns as spiritually superior to themselves (Müller-Böker 
1999). Bahuns in Chitwan do not follow many of the caste purity restrictions they are 
expected to follow, such as avoiding the consumption of alcohol or meat. Guneratne 
(1999) states "[Tharus] supposed backwardness is believed by most Tharus, and in 
particular the young, to stem not from inferiority in the ritual sphere, but in the economic 
[...] not because they are of low ritual status in relation to Brahmins but because they are 
uneducated" (165). The desire of the Tharu community to improve their social status, 
therefore, is expressed as a need to educate the community better, and to move away 
from traditional farming into more business oriented activities. 
Education, however, has failed to improve the perceived status of Tharus in 
Nepal, as many Tharus, especially those from poorer families, still have not achieved 
high levels of education. International labor migration has come to fill the vacuum, and is 
seen by many Tharus as an opportunity to improve their socio-economic status and 
bridge the overall gap between them and the Bahuns. As Ramesh, a young man from 
Pipariya expecting to get his working visa to Malaysia, explained: "We have no jobs 
here, but we also have no education. We are poor, we don't go to good schools, and we 
don't have good jobs. If I work abroad, I can make better money than in Nepal, and it will 
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be better for my family". Upward social mobility is the main motivation for Tharu labor 
migration. 
Internal migration from the hills to Chitwan and Pipariya, and the lack of well-
paying jobs available in the area, combined with the opportunities created by foreign 
markets to work abroad, lead to the large number of migrating young men. While labor 
migration in Nepal is by no means a new phenomenon, for the Tharu people it is a recent 
endeavor. Motivated by the desire to improve the socio-economic status of their families, 
more and more young Tharus are venturing abroad in search of employment. 
Part 2: Nepal, two centuries of migration 
Migration and remittances have a long history in Nepal, as Nepali people in 
general and Nepali men in particular have migrated for several generations. During the 
nineteenth century, Nepali Gurkhas began to be recruited into the British Indian army. 
For many decades, people have also descended from the hills of Nepal into India to work 
seasonally as manual labor, field workers, security guides, domestics and low-level 
public servants. Since the 1990s, however, a new kind of migration has emerged. With 
democratization and the liberalization of the economy, Nepal has become integrated into 
the movement of people to the expanding economies of East and South East Asia, as well 
as the Arab Gulf region (Graner and Gurung 2003). It is this recent phenomenon that has 
awakened interest from researchers about the impact of migration and remittances on the 
Nepali economy. This section will focus on the history of Nepali migration, and the 
political events that have helped shape migration from this country.  
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During the early 18th century the central Himalayan region was divided among 
several small kingdoms. Towards the latter half of the 18th century, the kingdom of 
Gorkha, a relatively poor one, began expanding under the leadership of King 
Prithvinarayan Shah and in seven years annexed territories five hundred times larger than 
itself (Onta and Tamang 2014:287). It was after this period of expansion that Nepal had 
its first institutionalized experience with out-migration.  
Nepali men developed a reputation abroad as reliable workers because of their 
role in the British Gurkha army. It was after the Anglo-Nepal war of 1814-1816 that the 
British "discovered" the Gurkhas (Pemble 1971). In the aftermath of this war, the Treaty 
of Sagauli was ratified, through which Nepal’s size was reduced to more or less its 
current territory (Onta and Tamang 2014). The war marked the end of the Nepali 
expansionist period. However, this war gave Nepali soldiers a good reputation among the 
British. Their reputation for endurance and reliability has continued until today. Many 
international companies want Nepali people to work for them, because Nepalis are 
considered to be hard working and trustworthy. Regardless of the veracity of these 
perceptions, they create a favorable market for Nepalis to obtain jobs abroad. 
Working for the East India Company, however, was not the only way in which 
Nepalis were employed in India. After the end of British colonial rule, Nepalis continued 
to descend from the hills into the Indian plains for seasonal employment. Low skilled 
Nepali migration into India was, until very recently, the preferred form of migration. 
Nepalis are employed in the private sector as security guards, domestic workers, and 
manual laborers in mines, tea plantations, and dairy farms (Sharma and Thapa 2013). The 
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movement of people between India and Nepal became increasingly popular after the 1950 
"Treaty of Peace and Friendship" between the two countries. The treaty allowed for faster 
and simpler travel across the border, while at the same time making it difficult to estimate 
the exact number of Nepalis working in India. Estimates differ widely, ranging from a 
few hundred thousand to a few million (Kollmair et al. 2006, World Bank 2011). The 
difficulty of accurately estimating the number of Nepalis in India is due to the high 
mobility of Nepali workers, the prevalence of cross-border marriages, the significant 
population of Indians with historical roots in Nepal, and the many Nepalis who have 
managed to gain domiciled status in India without it being recorded in either country 
(Sharma and Thapa 2013). 
Nepalis working in India contribute substantially to the subsistence of their 
families back home (Sharma and Thapa 2013). Migration to India has generally been 
considered, erroneously, a hill phenomenon, disregarding the movement of people from 
Nepal's Tarai into India (Sharma and Thapa 2013). The fact that many people from 
Nepal’s Tarai, including ethnic groups such as the Tharu and a large number of 
Madhesis2, also go to India for work is largely ignored not just in the migration literature 
but also by the public (Sharma and Thapa 2013). According to the 2001 CBS report, of 
the total 589,050 Nepali absentees in India, 168,756 were from the Tarai region (CBS 
2001). It has been argued that one reason why migrants from the Tarai become invisible 
in India is the cultural and linguistic similarities they share with inhabitants of north India 
(Neupane 2005). Cultural and linguistic boundaries become fluid around the physical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Groups of people who came to Nepal from Northern India several generations ago. Tharus, who identify 
as an indigenous group, do not consider themselves to be Madhesis. 
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India-Nepal border. In Pipariya, the movement of people across the border is a common 
practice. 
During the 20th century, Nepal’s politics oscillated between autocracy and 
democracy, affecting the way in which the population migrated, as well as how the 
government perceived migration. In 1951, the 104-year-old autocratic Rana oligarchy 
was overthrown, opening Nepal's doors to modernization. Through mediation by 
Jawarharlal Nehru —then Indian Prime Minister— the Rana rulers reached an agreement 
with King Tribhuvan Shah and the political party Nepali Congress (NC), agreeing to hold 
elections for a Constituent Assembly. The Shah dynasty emerged from the simple 
figurehead position it had been holding since 1846, and regained control. In 1959 the first 
parliamentary elections were held. However, this experiment with democracy was short-
lived and in 1960 King Tribhuvan's son, Mahendra Shah, dismissed the democratic 
government and set up a party-less centralized framework known as the Panchayat—or 
"council of elders"—system. 
The Rana, holding a tight grip on Nepal's population, did not promote institutions 
that could awaken political freedom in the population—such as modern schools, libraries 
and media outlets (Onta and Tamang 2014:287). By the end of their regime, there were 
few modern schools in the country, and only the elite had access to education. Nepal's 
population consisted mainly of uneducated peasants, and adult literacy rate was only 5% 
in 1951 (Parajuli and Das 2013). The lack of democratized development of the 
educational system during the first part of the 20th century set Nepal behind, and the 
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country's adult literacy rate according to UNESCO was 64.7% in 2011. This contributes 
to the stagnant economy, and accelerates labor migration. 
The end of the Rana regime signified an opening of the Nepali economy and a 
slow movement towards the modernization of the country's institutions and infrastructure. 
At the same time, Nepal’s foreign aid dependency deepened. Unable to reach the levels 
of educational, institutional and infrastructural development of the rest of the world, or 
even the region, the government trusted most of the country's development to foreign aid 
donors. The state managed to ensure involvement of many international donor agencies 
in the country’s development projects and thereby negotiate for the continued flow of 
foreign aid (Shrestha 2001:19). Foreign aid was also directed to try to solve the 
employment issue. Gaige (1975:200) states that [foreign] aid assisted the monarchy both 
directly and indirectly to create a better-equipped and better-trained army and to put a 
large number of potentially restive young men on the bureaucratic payrolls. The problem 
of employment is a recurring one in the 20th century history of the country. 
Development and foreign aid, however, created dependency without really 
addressing any of Nepal's institutional flaws. The national economy did not expand 
outside of the agriculture sector, which itself remained largely underdeveloped. Even 
today, 70% of Nepal's population subsists on agriculture. This economic reality was 
aggravated by insufficient jobs outside of the agrarian sector to employ the rapidly 
growing young population. Many young people, therefore, are pushed to look for 
employment outside of Nepal. 
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Migration to India was the prevalent form of migration until the 1980s, when the 
appearance of the rapidly developing economies of West, East and South East Asia, 
driven by the oil boom of the 1970s, created thousands of jobs in the construction and 
industrial sector. These economies turned to the huge masses of low skilled South and 
South East Asian workers for labor supply. Nepal's case is not unique, as many other 
countries in the region like India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Philippines 
are also involved in this labor practice. Because of its lower costs, migration from Nepal 
to India is still common and significant as many Nepalis still cannot afford to go to the 
new, more popular destinations of the Gulf countries and Malaysia (Sharma and Thapa 
2013). However, people who are able to pay for the costs of overseas migration prefer 
doing this, mostly due to the higher rate of remittances this kind of migration enables. 
The opportunities created by the development of these large Asian economies 
moved the Nepali government to promote the Foreign Employment Act of 1985. The Act 
specifies the countries to which Nepali citizens are encouraged to migrate. The Act also 
opened avenues for the private sector to facilitate foreign employment (DOFE Report 
2014). This allowed for the establishment of labor recruiting agencies throughout the 
Kathmandu valley, as well as in other parts of Nepal, which work with employer 
companies from Gulf countries to facilitate the process of sending Nepalis abroad. 
The country remained a centralized monarchy until 1990, when the first Jana 
Andolan or "People's Movement" forced the monarchy to restore multiparty democracy. 
A new Constitution limited the role of the monarchy—although it did not abolish it—
granting political and civil rights to the population. In 1991 elections were held, and the 
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democratically elected government embarked on a journey of economic liberalization and 
made official moves to a market economy, which also encouraged out-migration (DOFE 
Report 2014). During this period of economic liberalization, more and more Nepali 
people began to look for job opportunities in the larger Asian economies. This kind of 
migration is relatively short-term and circular, as most men are hired on two to three year 
contracts. At the end of the contract, the workers are given the option to continue 
working for the company or return to their home countries. 
The earliest record of labor permits issued by the Government shows that 3,605 
Nepalis left for foreign employment in 1993/94, primarily to Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (DOFE Report 2014). At the same 
time, although Nepalis had always been involved in different kinds of migration, the 
large number of people leaving after the 1990s liberalization of the economy is 
unprecedented. According to the Department of Foreign Labor, a total of 27,796 labor 
permits were issued in 1999/2000, and the 2001 National Population Census detected a 
decrease in Nepali migrants to India, declining from 89.2% of total emigrants in 1991 to 
77.3% in 2001 (Kansakar 2003). Since 2001, more than 100,000 labor permits have been 
issued each year, and the population census shows a sharp increase in the percentage of 
Nepalis abroad, from 3.2% in 2001 to 7.3% in 2011 (CBS 2011). 
From 1996 to 2006 Nepal suffered from civil unrest, generated by a Maoist 
insurrection, which created political turmoil and further affected employment possibilities 
within the country. The intensification of the conflict during the early 2000s coincides 
with the intensification of labor migration as stated in the paragraph above. While the 
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violence affected mainly the areas of Western Nepal, during the early 2000s the Chitwan 
district also saw an increase in violence. In Pipariya, the first men who decided to migrate 
to the Gulf did so around 2002 and 2003. Interviewing these first migrants, I noticed they 
all mentioned the Maoist conflict and the lack of job opportunities at home, as well as the 
imminent threat of being coopted by Maoist forces, as the main push in the decision to 
migrate. 
As more and more Nepalis left the country, the government decided to improve its 
policy on migration. In 2007, the Foreign Employment Act was updated in an attempt to 
regulate the activities of recruitment agencies, and to improve the conditions of Nepali 
workers abroad. This further regulated the procedures that should be followed by 
manpower agencies to receive accreditation. It also delimited the steps that both agencies 
and migrants should follow to legally migrate outside of Nepal. The main aim of the Act 
is to "make foreign employment business safe, managed and decent and protect the rights 
and interests of the workers who go for foreign employment" (Foreign Employment Act 
2007:1). There are around 700 active manpower agencies all over the Kathmandu valley, 
and many smaller agents work in areas outside of Nepal's capital. An estimated 90% of 
the people leaving Nepal for employment reasons do so through these agencies3. Because 
these agencies administer job opportunities and are in contact with the companies 
searching for workers, they are largely responsible for the experiences Nepalis have 
abroad. Unfortunately, there is also room for corruption and fraud in the way agencies are 
run. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Interview with Pravasi Nepali Coordination Committee (PNCC) on November 15, 2014. 
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The 2007 Act is partially an acknowledgment by the Nepali government of its 
own inability to employ the rapidly expanding young population. Scholars have argued 
against the risks of relying on migration as the main source of economic development for 
a country. Shrestha (2001) criticizes migration as a capitalist enterprise that adds a burden 
to the domestic economy. He quotes Meillasoux stating that "the propagation of semi-
proletariat circular migration was beneficial for the capitalist sector, but costly for the 
domestic economy. While this type of migration allowed the capitalist sector to take full 
advantage of migrants during their most productive years, it did not have to bear the costs 
of raising them through their non or least productive boyhood and supporting them 
during the old age. Such tasks and costs were assigned to domestic (peripheral) 
economies which derived little benefit from their adult migrants" (Shrestha 2001:54). I 
would disagree that, in the case of Nepal, migration stops the national economy from 
benefiting from its adult migrants, as given the lack of domestic employment, the 
remittances that adult migrants are able to send turns a person that would otherwise be 
unemployed—and economically unproductive—into an income generator. Unfortunately, 
as Shrestha indicates, migration generates a vicious cycle in which the most productive 
part of the labor force, which might have the will and strength to improve the national 
economy, leave the country, creating a demographic vacuum. Migration does provide a 
momentary solution to employment issues, but cannot ensure solutions of other structural 
problems of the state. 
Nepal's current political situation has also been detrimental to the development of 
a stronger national economy. The April and May 2015 earthquake were major setbacks 
for the development of infrastructure in Nepal, generating a humanitarian crisis in several 
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parts of the country. At the same time, the promulgation of a constitution in the aftermath 
of the earthquake fuelled disagreements among marginalized groups, mainly the 
Madeshi, but also the Tharu. A natural disaster, as well as the lack of a constitution that is 
equally legitimized by the government and by most sectors of the population, add to the 
unstable political situation in the country, and probably push more young people to leave 
Nepal in search of employment. 
The Nepali state has been unable to generate employment within its borders to 
maintain its increasingly large young population at home. Labor migration, as a regulated 
and state-legitimized initiative, became an alternative way for the State to ensure 
employment to the youth, without needing to create employment opportunities at home. 
In a largely agrarian country, but where agriculture is not sufficient given the small 
amount of arable land available and the rapidly increasing population, migration is 
perceived by young men, such as the members of the Brotherhood of the Returned, and 
their families, as the only reliable economic alternative.  
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Chapter 3: Theoretical approaches 
Part 1: Remittances — from a global and a localized perspective 
Macro-level approaches to remittances 
While changes take place socially and politically in Nepal, and the people of 
Pipariya become part of international migratory trends, migration scholars attempt to 
shed light on how remittances are conceptualized by the state and international 
multilateral agencies. The literature on migration is broad and contradictory, ranging 
from extreme opponents to a migration-based economy, to those who understand 
migration as an economic strategy. Economists, political scientists and sociologists have 
focused on the impact of migration and remittances on the national economy, as well as 
on policy recommendations for national and international organizations. Macroeconomic 
analysis of remittances allow for an understanding of the big picture—where migrants fit 
in the narrative of international development, and the government's interests in promoting 
migration. 
Building on some of the points expressed by Shrestha (2001) in the previous 
chapter, Taylor (1999) states that international labor migration represents a loss of human 
resources for migrant sending areas. This situation is reverted by remittances, as they 
represent the largest direct positive impact of migration on migrant sending areas (Taylor 
1999:67). Remittances, as the economic outcome of migration, reinsert the migrant in the 
local economy, despite the physical distance. 
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Some scholars have a cautionary approach to remittances. De Haas (2005) writes 
that ‘remittance euphoria’ is not justified, because of unattractive investment 
environments and restrictive immigration policies which interrupt circular migration 
patterns and prevent the high development potential of migration from being fully 
realized (de Haas 2005:1269). This is relatively true in the case of Nepal, where most of 
the country's population is still rural, and where agriculture has been for many decades 
the largest sector of the economy, only recently being replaced by the service industry. 
Remittances could promote Dutch disease4 effects in Nepal, without really 
promoting long-term investment in the country (Sapkota 2013). At the same time, 
Sapkota recognizes that remittances have become a strong source of income for the 
country and it is impossible to imagine a functioning Nepali economy without them. 
Therefore, it is necessary to accept them as a temporary resource, without considering 
remittances as a substitute to formulating and implementing growth and jobs creating 
policy reforms (Sapkota 2013). For a country like Nepal, where remittances are over 25% 
of the GDP, relying on remittances could be as dangerous as having a highly specialized 
economy that mainly depends on the ability of Nepali migrants to find work abroad. 
However, the strongly agrarian nature of the Nepali economy, with traditional, non-
commercial practices, acts as a limiting factor for the expansion of internal growth. 
As remittances keep increasing in their volume, they become key factors in 
promoting development of rural economies. It is impossible to separate migration from 
rural livelihoods and agriculture in Nepal. In 2010, the CIA Factbook estimated that 69% 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Economic term relating the increase in the economic development of a specific sector, with the decline of 
other sectors. 
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of Nepal's population was employed in agriculture, activity that in 2015 provided 31.7% 
of the country's GDP (CIA Factbook 2016).  The country's amount of arable land, 
however, is only 20% given its mountainous terrain. The lack of economic improvement 
opportunities offered by the agrarian sector, and the underdevelopment of other economic 
sectors such as services and industries are the main push for young people from rural 
areas to migrate. This is a reality of Nepal, as well as of other rural economies in the 
world. Rigg (2006:180) states that lives and livelihoods in the rural South are becoming 
increasingly divorced from farming and, therefore, from the land. Migration is seen as a 
key element in deagrarianization (Sunam and McCarthy 2016). 
In order for Nepal to fully realize the potential of migration, national and 
international migratory policies need to be more accepting of migration and remittances. 
There have been suggestions of progressive approaches to migratory policies, advocating 
for opening borders as a way to enhance the developmental potential of labor migration 
(de Haas, 2005:1281). As Ellis states, the adverse experience of being a migrant is in part 
created by public stances and policies, both internally and internationally (2003). Mobile 
populations get minimal attention in strategic thinking, and, if anything, they remain 
under an official cloud, determined by the policy stances taken on them many years ago. 
At the same time, the economies that receive migrants need to become more accountable 
for the well-being and the humanity of these workers. Migrants are citizens to whom civil 
rights apply whether they are in transit or living in a new destination: rights to personal 
security and rights of access to social services and facilities. Considerable scope exists for 
improving the policy environment that discharges such rights, and in formulating new 
modalities for the protection and support of migrants (Rogaly & Rafique 2003). 
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International organizations have voiced their concerns over the poor working 
condition of migrant workers, and the vulnerable situations they are exposed to, prone to 
exploitation and trafficking (Amnesty International 2015, World Bank Group 2015, 
HRW 2016). Shrestha (2008) believes that there is not enough information given to 
migrants about the labor conditions they will face outside of Nepal. Migrants are not 
properly trained, and are not aware of how to defend themselves from unsafe labor 
environments. Shrestha also considers that the government should play a larger role in 
regulating migration by adhering to a policy of economic diplomacy (2008:13). This 
position is conflicting, as it considers remittances vital for the stagnant Nepali economy 
of today, while at the same time determines necessary an intervention that will ensure 
migrant workers are safe and capable of maximizing their capacity for sending 
remittances back to Nepal. 
Governmental and non-governmental organizations are working to improve 
migrants' awareness, while at the same time migrants are taking care of each other. 
Thieme and Wyss (2005) consider in their study of the village of Sainik Basti that 
migrant workers and families have a specialized knowledge of what it means to migrate. 
Considering migrants purely as vulnerable removes the agency from them. It leads to the 
belief that migrants are unaware of risks and are tricked into working abroad. This is not 
always true. Nepali people are fully aware of the risks involved in migrating and working 
for companies in the Gulf and Malaysia, and they decide to do it regardless. The 
government has also developed awareness programs that work under the premise that 
migrants are unaware and uninformed, and should be better equipped to deal with the 
risks of migration.  
 31 
As Gamburd (2000:235) states, "instead of taking these negative assumptions for 
granted, social scientists must carefully examine how the relationships, travels and 
transactions in question actually benefit and hurt those involved, critically accounting for 
the power of images and horror stories to affect scholarly and general conceptions of 
migration". These negative assumptions are dangerous because they impact the way in 
which migrants perceive themselves, and their own capacity to advocate for themselves 
in front of their employers. A board Pravasi Nepali Coordination Committee (PNCC), a 
Nepali NGO organized by returned migrants with the aim of empowering Nepali workers 
abroad, told me in an interview that many Nepalis do not access the few benefits that the 
government provides because they are unaware of their rights as workers. Unions are 
non-existent, particularly in the Gulf countries. However, this does not mean that Nepali 
labor migrants have always been unsuccessful in defending their own rights. Sandeep, a 
young man from Pipariya who returned from Dubai after being there for only eight days, 
told me that he initially accepted the job offer because it was advertised as inside a 
cement factory. When they arrived to Dubai, however, they realized they had to work 
outside, carrying cement bags under the sun. The whole group, 38 Nepali migrant 
workers, protested against it and managed to get their passports back and safely return to 
Nepal. Sandeep then decided to migrate again, this time to Malaysia, where he worked as 
a machine operator for five years. 
In order to ensure safety and to maximize the sacrifices individual migrants 
make, population mobility needs to be part of poverty reduction policies as an 
opportunity and a benefit, not a detriment (Ellis 2003). Migrants contribute to 
development both in origin and destination areas. They display initiative just by the act of 
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migrating. Good ideas get carried from one place to another by migrants, who can also 
provide technological advances in their home communities, pointing out outmoded 
technical practices that they have seen replaced by others in the countries where they 
have traveled. The impact of migration goes beyond the economic, having the power to 
alter social structures within the left behind community.  
Localized approaches to remittances—the stay-behind people 
In this ethnography I focus mainly on the impact migration has on the stay-
behind community, centering the analysis on the household. While understanding the 
large-scale implications of migration and policy making is necessary, understanding 
migrants and their families motivations and reasons to engage in migration allows for a 
more holistic understanding of the localized impact of migration. Much of the research on 
migration is focused on the migrant experience; however, there has also been some 
attention paid to the left-behind family. The research of the migrants' families focuses 
mainly on two different topics: first, the use of remittances, and second, the changes in 
family structure as migrants leave their homes. 
Mobility and international migration are not equally available to all Nepali 
families. The very poorest households tend to be tied to the village in various forms of 
debt bondage, which constrain their ability to seek work elsewhere for anything other 
than a short period  (Seddon et al. 2002:20). Seddon's point implies that in order to be 
able to migrate, families need to have a certain amount of capital. Without initial capital, 
the movement of people is constrained. In the case described in this ethnography, Tharu 
people are positioned in the society in such a way that they can draw from their capital —
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which is not the same for all Tharus— in order to migrate. Distinct migratory patterns 
will emerge depending on the amount of capital each family possesses, and chapter 4 will 
focus on these differences. Social class and economic status have a strong influence on 
the household's ability to make decisions. 
The prospect of foreign employment is not enough for families to move out of 
agriculture completely. Remittances become, therefore, a contribution to the household 
income, complementing—and largely expanding—that household's traditional agrarian 
assets. As Seddon et al. (2002:21) affirm, non-farm income is becoming increasingly 
critical in determining the overall livelihood status of the household and its members. 
Rural Nepali families are not able to detach from agriculture completely and labor 
migration, as it is present in Nepal, is only a short-term activity that involves high risks. 
However, the lives of rural families should not be essentialized as mainly agricultural. 
According to Seddon, an overwhelming concentration on the role of agriculture has 
blinded researchers and policy-makers alike to the fact that the rural population of Nepal 
consists not of “farmers” but of individuals and households whose livelihoods are 
sustained by a wide variety of activities and income sources (Seddon et al. 2002). 
While some families opt for investment, other families spend remittances on 
consumer goods (food, houses, consumer durables). Investing in assets would give rise to 
improved livelihoods in the future, while the expenditure on consumer goods only allows 
for temporary perceived benefits from the money. This decision is criticized by 
development agencies (World Bank 2011), and government agencies (DOFE Report 
2014) equally; however, certain financial decisions praised in the developed world do not 
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make sense in other parts of the world—partially because of lack of incentive to invest. 
These discrepancies between migrant households’ behaviors and policy makers are 
generated around misunderstandings about life towards the bottom of world income 
distributions (Ellis 2003).  
Gender is as important as social class in determining access to migration and 
remittances. In Nepal, only 5.6% of total migrant workers are females (DOFE 2014). 
Strict regulations on the migration of women, and limitations on destinations female 
workers could apply for contributed to this gender difference of labor migrants. At the 
same time, the number of women migrating for labor has been rising, with an increase of 
239% in the last seven years (DOFE 2014). Different accessibility in terms of gender 
implies that women represent the largest stay-behind demographic, and any analysis of 
the impact of remittances in the receiving communities should address the issue of 
women. In the particular case of Nepal, few scholars have focused on studying the family 
rather than the migrant. Shrestha and Conway (2001), Kaspar (2005), Maharjan et al. 
(2012), and Adhikari and Hobley (2015) present very interesting views of how the family 
reorganizes itself as the migrant leaves. They all assess the roles and responsibilities of 
stay behind women, and how female roles change in the context of Nepali migration. 
There are certain cross-cultural similarities that can help us better understand the 
complexity of people's movements and the greater impact migration has in the 
community where migrants come from. From some authors' perspective, male migration 
leads to changes in the gender division of labor, which, in turn, leads to greater women’s 
mobility, autonomy, and overall empowerment by providing new fill roles, skills, 
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opportunities, and decision-making powers over the use of resources (Connell 1984; 
Bever 2002; Chant and Craske 2003; Quisumbing 2003). After the male figure leaves the 
household, women have new opportunities to navigate their traditional roles and 
responsibilities. Sadiqi and Ennaji (2004) and Hondagneu-Sotelo (1992) suggest that 
male migration helps increasing women’s autonomy and self-esteem by expanding their 
role and responsibilities in the household beyond the traditional ones. The gendered 
impact of migration does not exclusively affect women; in her study of female migrant 
workers in Sri Lanka, Gamburd (2000) describes the involvement of women with 
employment outside of the household, and outside of the village, and the transformations 
it has generated in traditional village and family structures. Gender roles and 
responsibilities are culturally situated, and ethnographic studies allow us to perceive the 
particular changes each community experiences. 
The impact of migration on women within Nepal depends on the position of 
women in society (Adhikari and Hobley 2015). Because patrilocality is practiced 
throughout Nepal, after the husband's migration women find themselves relatively 
isolated in their in-laws' household. It takes several years for a new daughter-in-law to be 
able to enjoy certain privileges—such as a reduced workload—and it is generally after 
the birth of their first son that women begin to be more accepted by senior women in their 
husband's household (Bennett 1983). Because the situation of women is so delicate in 
Nepal, and migration is such a crucial activity for many Nepali households, we would 
expect the role of migrant's wives—and also mothers—to be better depicted in Nepal and 
migration studies. However, as Shrestha and Conway (2001) express it, migrants’ wives 
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exist in the shadow—in the shadow of their husbands, in the shadow of the mountains, 
and in the shadow of the academic discourse on migration. 
Maharjan et al. (2012) suggest that migration has helped women broaden and 
deepen their involvement in rural society as a result of male out-migration, which could 
lead to either the empowerment or disempowerment of women, depending on the 
migration pattern and remittances received by the household. Larger remittances 
generally help reduce the physical work burden and increase decision-making roles, thus 
empowering the women left behind. Where women are able to manage the remittance 
money and employ workers to help in the field, they are able to substitute for the work 
their husbands would be doing at home (Maharjan et al. 2012). Even if the type of labor 
does not change for a migrant's wife, the intensity clearly does. Women generally work 
more during migration because they have to shoulder most of their husbands' duties in 
addition to the usual workload (Kaspar 2005). However, low remittances have the 
opposite impact, and saddle women with a greater physical workload (Maharjan et al. 
2012). Many migrants need to take loans in order to pay for the costs of migration, and if 
remittances are not enough to help pay the loan back, women are not only responsible for 
the increased household work, they also need to find the money to cover loan expenses. 
Therefore, the amount of remittances that the migrant makes abroad has great impact on 
the stay behind family. 
Because remittances are important, the person entitled to receive the money 
becomes important within the household too. In some households, it is the migrant's wife 
who receives remittances. That is when we perceive the changes in workload described 
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before. In some of these cases, their communities can pressure them for money and help 
because of a belief that their husbands are sending them sufficient remittances (Adhikari 
and Hobley 2015). In other cases, especially in joint households, other male members of 
the household, or the migrant's mother, are the ones entitled to remittances. In this case, 
wives of migrant husbands become economically dependent on their relatives who 
received the remittances, and thus women lose overall control over the resources 
(Adhikari and Hobley 2015). Where households had recently split from the joint 
household there can be signs of tensions when the wife receives all the remittance and 
makes decisions about its use for the sole benefit of her nuclear household (Adhikari and 
Hobley 2015). Overall, women may find that their relationships with male relatives and 
with other women in their networks worsen because of tensions after their husbands 
migrate (Adhikari and Hobley 2015), tensions that are largely based on the entitlement to 
remittances. 
Women's decision-making power seems to be largely affected by remittances, 
and by the absence of the male figure in the household. Research in the hills of Nepal 
shows that women have a greater role in operational decisions such as those about crop 
and variety selection, and a lesser one in strategic decisions such as about nonfarm 
investments (Maharjan et al. 2012). However, this empowerment is only temporary. 
Although the women take on more decision-making power during their husbands’ 
absence, it is often assumed that the migration will be temporary and the husband will 
resume his role upon return (Kaspar 2005). Regardless of the absence of their husbands, 
women are still unable to make decisions regarding certain specific aspects of domestic 
life. Women still depend on their husbands or older male kin member to make big 
 38 
household decisions such as land purchase, construction of new buildings or 
improvement of existing ones, purchase of large livestock and selecting the school their 
children will attend (Adhikari and Hogel 2015). The limited role of women in nonfarm 
investment can be attributed to traditional gender discrimination, where women are raised 
to follow decisions, not to make them (Maharjan et al. 2012). It is clear that women 
become de facto household heads although their husbands remain the formal household 
heads (Kaspar 2005). 
While some of these changes, which affect mainly women, are a direct response 
to male out-migration, some changes are partially or not at all connected to migration. 
The changes in the rural division of labor seem to be one of them. The traditional gender 
division of labor in agriculture is weakening and the feminization of agriculture5, already 
prevalent in Nepal, is on the rise. However, no significant difference is seen between 
migrant and non-migrant households in this aspect (Maharjan et al. 2012). Although it is 
clear that changes are happening in the Nepali society, and that migration is partially 
responsible for them, it is also important to study which cultural spaces are directly 
affected by remittances and migrations, and which spaces are changing due to the 
country's development and post-conflict economic stabilization. 
Studies conducted in Nepal recognize the importance of migration as a way to 
improve household livelihood. This happens in the context of increased population 
pressure on resources, decline in resource base, and the need to consume modern 
amenities to express modernity through the generation of additional cash income 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Feminization of agriculture refers to the increase of women's participation in the agricultural sector, 
particularly in the developing world. 
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(Macfarlane 1976; Adhikari 1996; Bishop 1998; Adhikari and Hobley 2015). It seems 
likely that migration will continue happening, and more and more Nepali households will 
become engaged in this kind of economic activity. There is, therefore, an urgent need to 
consider the changes in gender roles in the context of male out-migration in the economic 
development policies and strategies of Nepal (Maharjan et al. 2012). As international 
migration is a widespread livelihood strategy and will not cease in the near future, the key 
development issue is to reduce the social and economic costs of migration and increase 
its returns for the migrants and those remaining at home (Thieme and Wyss 2005:89). 
Part 2: Theoretical approaches to people's movements 
There are several different approaches to the study of migration and remittances. 
Because these are mainly economic activities, it is in the field of economics where we see 
a great array of theoretical frameworks develop. However, sociology and anthropology 
have also contributed to these frameworks. To be able to send money home is the main 
motivation for migration, and that is why understanding remittances first is important. 
The two most important approaches to the study of remittances, which clearly connect to 
the movement of Pipariya’s Tharus, lie within the realm of the New Economics of Labor 
Migration —a joint venture between economics and sociology to explain household 
behaviors— and the realm of anthropological gift theory. 
Remittances and migration not only produce changes in the economic status of 
migrants and their families. They also have a great impact on the social relationships of 
migrants. To account for the social aspect of migration, I will make use of “Social Capital 
Theory” developed initially by Pierre Bourdieu in his 1973 study of Algerian migrant 
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workers, and expanded later on by several sociologists and anthropologists. Any 
approach to the study of remittances and migration that is purely economic or purely 
social is limited, and it is only by combining ideas from different fields —economics, 
sociology and anthropology— that we achieve a more comprehensive understanding of 
the reasons for and the consequences of labor migration. 
Remittances as livelihood strategies 
The approach developed by the New Economics of Labor Migration was 
originally a response to the argument of classical economists that remittances were an 
altruistic behavior of the migrant. Classical economy considers people’s behaviors to be 
“rational” by making economic sense and profit. Part of this theory focuses on the 
“happiness” that an individual receives from a monetary transaction. In order to quantify 
happiness, classical economy uses the concept of “marginal utility”, which are the units 
of happiness, or gains or losses of consuming a good or service (Mankiw 2007). Classical 
economy makes sense of remittances by stating that the marginal utility of a migrant is 
equal to the marginal utility of the family that receives the remittances when that 
remittance money is spent (Agarwal and Horowitz 2002). It is considered to be altruistic 
because it is as if the migrant was giving up their own utility in favor of their family’s 
happiness. The destination for migration is determined by the geographic differences in 
labor supply and demand, as places where job opportunities and income are greater than 
the cost of migration —that cost being the removal of a working pair of hands from the 
originating household, or the literal cost of relocating for work. Migrants generally 
maximize utility by moving to wherever the expected gains from their labor are greatest 
(Todaro and Maruszko 1987).  
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This kind of analysis, however, fails to account for the social aspect of 
remittances: the fact that individuals are sending their money not to any random group, 
but to one of which they consider themselves part. This is the gap that the New 
Economics of Labor Migration tries to assess, with the development of “livelihood 
strategies” and their improvement as motivations for migration. 
When looking at migration and remittances as livelihood strategies, it is important 
to understand the origins of this theory. It developed from Amartya Sen's work on food 
security and famine. In this approach, resources are referred to as ‘assets’ or ‘capitals’ 
and are often categorized between five or more different asset types owned or accessed 
by family members: human capital (skills, education, health), physical capital (produced 
investment goods), financial capital (money, savings, loan access), natural capital (land, 
water, trees etc.), and social capital (networks and associations). Even people living in 
extreme poverty have access to these different assets (Sen 1981). This concept is radical 
in that it does not consider poverty as uniquely an extreme experience. It acknowledges 
that there are different kinds of poverty, and that almost every household, regardless of 
how poor they are in absolute terms, have access to certain kinds of capital. For this 
framework, poverty and migration are intertwined to the point where one justifies the 
existence of the other. 
The British sociologist Frank Ellis expands Sen’s theory and develops the 
sustainable livelihoods approach (SLA). In this theory, migration is understood as a 
spatial separation between the location of a resident household or family, and one or 
more livelihood activities engaged in by family members (Ellis 2003). It is a central 
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feature of the livelihoods of the majority of households in low-income countries. The 
income of the migrant abroad cannot be separated from the assets of the family in the 
place of origin. 
While considering livelihood assets allows us to consider the agency of low 
income migrating households in their economic development, it is important to 
understand to what extend poverty is the motivation for migration. In his analysis on the 
New Economics of Labor Migration, Stark Oded (1991) argues that "[...] the decision by 
households to send migrants to foreign labor markets is influenced by their initial 
perceived relative deprivation within the reference group". The reference group is 
understood as that group within society that has a higher economic advantage. It is in 
relationship to these higher income groups that lower income households compare 
themselves. Social disparities, therefore, play an important role in the motivations to 
migrate, and should not be overlooked in the study of remittances. 
The SLA theory focuses strongly on how the lives of rural populations are 
affected by either internal or international migration. With respect to assets in rural areas 
in particular, remittances from migration can strengthen livelihoods by allowing for 
investment in agrarian activities such as land, labor, pesticides, and machinery. 
Remittances can also allow for investments outside of agriculture. These mainly focus on 
investment in education, resulting in better prospects for the next generation, and 
investment in assets permitting local non-farm income to be generated. Remittances 
allow for a diversification of the household’s economy. At the same time, remittances 
benefit the village economy as a whole, as there is new capital circulating in it. People are 
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able to buy more goods of daily use, and the construction sector also develops, as more 
families improve their housing conditions. All these relatively "short-term" investments 
as well as some more permanent ones, activate the local economy to an extent that 
traditional agrarian markets are not able to. 
Although, as we have seen, there are several benefits to understanding migration 
in terms of livelihood assets, there are also limitations. The concept of household 
strategies is only relevant in the case of relatively poor, rural households; it does not 
explain migration and remittances in the case of those living in abject poverty, or in the 
case of the higher strata of the society —or reference group, as Stark labels them 
(1991:174). In the case of abject poverty, it should be noted that the livelihood assets 
model believes that it is necessary to have a certain amount of capital to make migration 
possible in the first place, especially considering that leaving for a different country is a 
costly enterprise. For people from a higher economic status, migration is a different 
experience because of ease of accessibility and relocation in a new place. The concept of 
remitting is also different because the money can be directed to causes other than helping 
the household meet ends. Therefore, this framework becomes relevant depending on the 
kind of population whose remittance and migration patterns we are interested in studying. 
Remittances as gift 
Anthropological gift theory allows us to understand remittances from a cultural 
perspective. In his essay “The Gift” (1925), the French anthropologist Marcel Mauss 
defines the obligations of gift giving: the obligation to give gifts (by giving, one shows 
oneself as generous, and thus as deserving of respect), the obligation to receive them (by 
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receiving the gift, one shows respect to the giver), and the obligation to return the gift 
(thus demonstrating that one's honor is equivalent to or more than that of the original 
giver). Gift giving is embedded in morality, and giving, receiving and returning gifts 
create a moral bond between the persons exchanging gifts. At the same time, Mauss 
emphasizes the competitive and strategic aspect of gift giving: by giving more than one's 
competitors, one lays claim to greater respect than them (Polanyi 1944). Remittances are, 
from this perspective, a gift given to the household by the migrant member, reinforcing a 
social connection between the migrant and the household. 
Remittances as gift come, from the perspective of this framework, in several 
shapes. They come in the form of money, mainly, but also in the form of things: from 
cloth to technology, there are several items that migrants send from abroad that constitute 
part of the capital they remit back to the household. In his introduction to the book The 
Social Life of Things Arjun Appadurai discusses the social value of commodities. He 
claims that all things have commodity potential, and commodities are part of an exchange 
that gives them “life” in social interactions (1986). By adding a social value to things, the 
focus shifts from Marx’s production-dominated view of the commodity, into a total 
trajectory from production, through exchange/distribution, to consumption (Appadurai 
1986). The analysis can be easily extended to all the things that migrants remit to their 
households. Remitting implies that the migrant is still strongly attached to the household, 
and considers it his or her priority to improve the livelihood of those back home. 
Therefore, there is a social value added to the money or the things the migrant is 
remitting, a value that moves that capital away from a purely economic transaction. It is 
not just utility that is being transferred; it is the maintenance of a social relationship. 
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Reciprocity, a crucial component of gift theory, is also present in the remittance 
exchange. In Mauss’ original gift theory, reciprocity implied that the returned gift places 
the original receiver in an equal or even higher position than the original giver. In her 
critical approach to gift theory, Karen Sykes determines that how to assess why people 
become obligated to each other poses an enormous question (Sykes 2005). From her (and 
Mauss’) perspective, people feel that the gift is a magical or spiritual aspect of human 
relations, an aspect that stands apart from other ways of keeping social associations. 
However, because the remittance transaction happens within the realm of the household, 
kinship relations affect the way in which reciprocity is played out. This idea, known as 
generalized reciprocity, implies that the motivation to remit belongs to the kind of 
reciprocity aimed at maintaining ties and good relationships between families and friends 
(Cronk 2012:164).  
However, gift giving and generosity are not as unconditional as we would like to 
believe (Cronk 2012:164). Migrants remit to their families because they are interested in 
maintaining a social bond with them. Does the reward for migrating and remitting come 
from the way in which the personal status within the society changes after the migrant is 
able to send foreign money? Within the household, migrants acquire a stronger voice in 
the decision making process of the family. Hari, who worked in Malaysia for ten years, 
told me about how he asked his family to save most of the money he was remitting, and 
once he returned to Nepal he invested it in building a large, cement house. His family 
used part of the money to cover certain other expenses, such as his two children’s school 
fees, and his mother’s medical bills, but even from far away he was consulted, and his 
authority figure in the family strengthened. While these changes in the perception of 
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migrants are happening within the household, there are other social aspects that motivate 
people to migrate, aspects that fall outside of the realm of the family. 
Remittances as social capital 
Remittances are the economic motivation to migrate, but there is also a social 
component that encourages young men to leave Pipariya. There is a specific social status 
attached to those who have left the village, and labor migrants are not excluded from this. 
The theories already proposed contribute to this idea of social capital of migration. The 
sustainable livelihoods approach, beyond the material inputs to migration, considers as 
inputs the social status of migration, and the individual experience of the migrant. They 
are associated with a higher social status because they are able to leave the home village 
and travel the world. This pushes young men and women to want to migrate because of 
the new acquired status migration will give them once they return to their homes. 
Therefore, while there is a family component to migration and a necessity to improve the 
household’s livelihood, there are also personal reasons that might influence the decision 
of people to migrate, even in societies where kinship ties are considered more important 
than personal motivations. 
In 1986 Pierre Bourdieu wrote an essay titled "Forms of Capital". In this essay he 
expanded on the notion of "capital" from a purely economic rationale into a more 
inclusive one. According to Bourdieu, there are other forms of capital, such as cultural 
and social capital, which are as important as economic capital in influencing the behavior 
of people and communities. Social capital is particularly relevant to migration and the 
networks migrants create in their movement from one place to another. 
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Social capital is formed by all the resources of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition —or in other 
words, membership in a group —which provides each of its members with the backing of 
the collectively owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various 
senses of the word (Bourdieu 1986). As young Tharu men become interested in 
migrating, they contact other people from their hometowns who have also migrated. A 
social tie to a current or former migrant constitutes a potential source of social capital 
because someone with migratory experience can provide information, resources, and 
assistance to lower the costs of movement. Migrant networks connect non migrants in 
places of origin to current migrants at places of destination and former migrants in home 
communities, thereby reducing the costs and increasing the expected benefits of 
migration (Bohra and Massey 2009). As we will see in the next chapter, when making 
decisions on where to migrate, most of these young Tharu men consult their older cousins 
and uncles, or neighbors, and rely on their contacts and information in order to secure a 
job abroad. Migration has a spiral effect, where one person migrating is able to increase 
the social capital available to other people in their home community interested in 
migrating to the same place. 
The idea of social capital assumes that people will be more likely to migrate to 
areas where other people from their community have previously migrated. However, 
migratory experiences change over time, and as migrants learn more about the migration 
process itself, they also dare to engage in new processes or go to places where no other 
person from their community has been. As a result, migration-specific human capital 
tends to act as a substitute for social capital on subsequent trips. As migrants continue 
 48 
moving, we would also expect other variables that were significant in determining a first 
trip to become less important in explaining repeat migration (Bohra and Massey 2009). 
In terms of social capital, migration also has an impact on the stay-behind 
community, as migrants acquire knowledge abroad not only about migratory procedures, 
but also about foreign cultures and practices. Peggy Levitt (1998) conceptualizes "social 
remittances" as the local-level, migration driven form of cultural diffusion. Social 
remittances imply all the knowledge migrants bring with them upon their return from 
abroad. They are making sense of their experiences using the interpretive frames they 
bring with them (Levitt 1998) and in the process they transform the home society. 
Senders—Levitt's definition of migrants—adopt new ideas and practices while abroad, 
and at the same time filter out others. Recipients—the stay-behind family—include 
certain elements from the senders' experiences, while ignoring others. This exchange of 
foreign and local knowledge exercised by those who are part of or impacted by migration 
contributes in a localized way to a transnational system of cultural diffusion. 
The theory behind migration and the social and economic impact of remittances 
pushes us to understand the world beyond the localized experience. Understanding the 
experiences within the community that motivate people to migrate is important. 
However, understanding the consequences of migration, especially the impact that 
remittances have on the social landscape of the stay-behind family, as well as the transfer 
of knowledge and culture between the home and the host society allows for a more 
complex and globally grounded definition of people's movements. 
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Chapter 4: "There is nothing to do here, so we migrate" 
Pipariya, the village where this study is located, is an ethnically mixed village of 
the Chitwan district. The population is mainly Tharu and Bahun, though there are people 
from other ethnic groups such as Newars and Gurungs, as well as service and 
untouchable castes. The different ethnic and caste groups engage in diverse economic 
activities. While Tharus are mainly farmers, and own some small shops in the village, 
Bahuns tend to participate more in commerce, and own most of the large enterprises 
around the village. In Pipariya in particular, Bahuns own the village's oil and rice mills, 
and the construction materials store. These two main ethnic and social groups inhabit 
relatively distinct areas of the village. The following map shows the distribution of 
houses in Pipariya by ethnicity.  
 
Figure 1: Map of Pipariya 
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Circle-shaped symbols represent Tharu households, while rectangle-shaped 
symbols represent Bahun families. Of a total of 171 houses, 127 are Tharu (around 73% 
of the village) and 37 Bahun (21% of the village). The rest of the 7 houses in the village 
belong to other caste or ethnic groups, and are not represented in the map. This map also 
shows which households currently have a member abroad, or have had one in the recent 
past. Black signals houses that have members working abroad, either in the Gulf 
countries or Malaysia, while the lighter shade of grey indicates houses that have members 
in Australia, Europe, or the United States. White indicates houses with no migrants. 
The first and most astonishing fact is the number of households in the village that 
have at least one person abroad. A total of 71 houses (or 40% of all the houses in the 
village) have a migrant member. Of these 71 houses, 14 belong to Bahun families, and 57 
are Tharu. Therefore, 80% of the migrant-sending households in Pipariya belong to the 
Tharu community. 
The second interesting point emerges from the different patterns of migration 
between the two ethnic communities. Of the 57 Tharu households who have members 
abroad, 48 have people working in the Gulf countries or Malaysia. Only 9 have people 
who left Pipariya to study, and sometimes also work, in Australia, the United States, or 
Europe. All 14 Bahun households, instead, had a son who left Pipariya with a student visa 
to Australia. Bahun migration seems to follow a more linear path, where the parents pay 
for their son to get a bachelor's degree in Australia. After graduating they settle in the 
country and either keep sending money back to their parents, or are able to bring their 
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parents to Australia with them. Tharus, on the other hand, are mainly migrating for labor, 
and are therefore less likely to relocate abroad. 
This analysis raises questions about the differences in opportunities that caste and 
ethnic groups have. Why is it that such a large number of households in Pipariya are 
sending people abroad? Why are Tharu people more likely to migrate for labor and 
Bahuns more likely to migrate for education? Because most Tharu households engage in 
labor migration to the Gulf and Malaysia, this chapter will focus on explaining this 
particular migratory experience. It will explore the above posed questions, describing the 
push and pull factors of migration for Tharu men, as well as the steps that they need to 
follow in order to work abroad. 
Part 1: Reasons to leave home 
It is a warm winter afternoon, and Reeta and I are sitting together by the well. I 
have just finished doing laundry, and Reeta is washing her son's clothes. Reeta is a 
young, charming woman. She must be around 27 years old, and married into this 
household six years ago. Her husband has been working in Dubai since before they got 
married. He is only able to return to Nepal every two years, when he gets a two-month 
long vacation. In the six years they have been married, Reeta and her husband have lived 
together only for about six months. 
I have been meaning to ask Reeta about a particular event, but it never seems to 
be the right time. What I am interested in knowing is what relatives do for the migrant 
workers on the day they leave. Is there a special pooja—worship ceremony—to celebrate 
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the departure of the migrant? Does the family give the migrant red tika6 to wish him a 
safe travel? I start asking Reeta a few questions about her husband to find out. Talking to 
Reeta about her husband is always a complicated topic, as it makes her feel melancholic 
and sometimes causes her to stop talking at all. After a few questions about his next visit 
to Nepal, and how long he would stay, I finally ask her: what do you do for your husband 
on the day he has to leave? Does the family prepare anything for him? 
She quietly responds: "Well, when a person is leaving for a trip, what the family 
does is that they fill two vases with water, and place them in the floor by the door. Then 
the man who is leaving goes out from that door, and his father and mother give him tika. 
Then other relatives prepare garlands and hang it from his neck, and people cry and then 
the man leaves". I noted the impersonal way she told the story, without mentioning her 
husband, talking in general terms about all the people who leave. Then she added "But I 
never do it." I ask her: "do you never cry, or do you never prepare the pooja for your 
husband?" "Of course I cry, a little bit!" she says "but I never give my husband tika". 
"Why not?" I wonder. At this point Reeta gives me a glance that indicates I should know 
better than to ask that question, a look she often gives me when I have been inquiring too 
much. She answers, nonetheless: "How many times has he come and gone, even before I 
came to this house? He doesn't like it, so we just don't do it". 
I hoped my conversation with Reeta would give me a better picture of what kind 
of rituals families perform for their loved ones before they migrate. But it did more than 
that. Talking to Reeta I understood how common it has become for Pipariya's young men 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 A mixture of uncooked rice grains, yogurt and red powder placed on the forehead of someone in special 
or religious occasions, or as an expression of honor. 
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to leave, common to the point that no rituals or special celebration is needed when the 
migrant has already left several times. This, of course, varies from family to family, but 
the fact that certain families do not celebrate their migrants as they leave, indicates that to 
a certain extent, people in Pipariya and the migrants themselves are used to coming and 
going, without considering it a special event anymore. My next concern, then, was trying 
to understand what is it about the socio-economic opportunities in Pipariya that push 
young Tharu men to migrate. 
In the dry months of winter, there is less work to do in the fields and the people of 
Pipariya have more free time. Women wake up early in the morning, tend to the animals 
and the kitchen gardens, and prepare the morning meal. The pace of the day then slows 
down, and women have time to wash clothes like Reeta and I do, lay grains to dry under 
the shy winter sun, and converse with each other, until the sun begins to set and it is time 
to prepare the evening meal. Men also have little to do after eating the morning meal. As 
the sun begins to disperse the morning fog, one by one the men of Pipariya, old and 
young, head down to the creek, where they set up mats and pull out a few decks of cards. 
They spend most of the day playing different card games, sometimes including poker, a 
newly acquired ability brought from abroad by some of the returned migrants. They head 
back home right before sunset. This is a daily ritual, just like that of the Brotherhood of 
the Returned, the young men I introduced before. 
Dipendra, a young man of 25 years who lives next to the house where I am 
staying, stops sometimes on his way to the creek to talk to me. His task is to carry and 
store the decks of cards used by the men to play games. He worked as a cook in Saudi 
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Arabia for five years, but recently returned to Pipariya because he did not think he was 
making enough money abroad. Towards the end of my second stay in Pipariya, he agrees 
to be my informant. He can tell stories in the most entertaining way, and I thought he 
could provide me with some good and funny examples of what Tharu men experience 
abroad. As a hotel cook, he tells stories of learning how to speak Arabic while preparing 
a soccer court and organizing a small team with other hotel workers and supervisors. He 
also talks about cooking the most refined meat for the feasts of Saudi Arabian sheiks; 
meat that he did not even know which animal it came from. During the night, he used to 
spend time with other hotel workers, coming up with different combinations of fruits and 
nuts to make home-made alcohol, a risky move in a country where alcohol consumption 
is strictly prohibited. 
During our interview, he told me he was waiting for a confirmation to go work in 
South Africa. "I am looking forward to going back abroad", he said. "Here, my only 
occupation is to open the casino [he laughs]. When I am abroad I have work and I am 
busy doing things". I asked him why does he not try to find a job near Pipariya. "The pay 
will never be the same", he said. "And here there are few jobs, I may work one month but 
the next one I never know." Dipendra's situation is not unique. Many young people 
struggle to find jobs outside of their families' fields, and when they do, they are paid 
meager salaries. 
Pipariya and the villages near it have a unique economic situation because of their 
proximity to the Chitwan National Park. The national park is one of Nepal’s most famous 
tourist attractions, and a large tourism industry has developed around it. The household in 
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which I stayed while I conducted my research is located near the Tharu Cultural 
Museum, a local initiative to open the doors of Tharu culture to the tourists who visit the 
area. The compound of houses is also opened to tourists, who can arrange the visit at one 
of the tourism centers near the park and come in with a Tharu guide who explains to them 
aspects of traditional village lifestyle. The interaction between the tourists and the 
household members, however, is limited probably due to language barriers, and these 
“Tharu village visits” are experienced more like an extension or live representation of 
what is first observed at the Museum.  
Guneratne (2001) describes this same village walk as an event organized by the 
high-caste tour guides in the nearby tourist town. The village walk allowed these guides 
to present themselves to foreigners as "forward"7, English-speaking people, much 
different from the "backward", "traditional", and "jungly" Tharus. This does not seem to 
be the case anymore, as the only tourist guide I observed entering the compound with 
foreign tourists is also a Tharu person. There are also large groups of Nepali tourists, 
generally from Kathmandu, who come to visit the museum, but do not partake in the 
village walk. During my first fieldwork, before the April 2015 earthquake, it was 
common to see groups of 10 to 20 tourists from all parts of the world visiting the village 
daily. During my second fieldwork, eight months after the earthquake, the number of 
international tourists had drastically reduced, but there were still many domestic tourists 
from other parts of Nepal arriving by bus every day to visit the museum. The village has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 According to Guneratne (2001:503) "'Backwardness' and 'forwardness' are new 
concepts closely linked to processes of modernity, in particular a statewide system of 
schooling and the rapid development of commerce centered in bazaar towns". In the 
context of Pipariya, education is the most important attribute of "forwardness". 
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been for several years exposed to these visits from both Nepali and international tourists, 
making local Tharus well aware of diversity and the socio-economic differences that exist 
between them and other Nepalis and foreigners. Tharus are also aware of the comforts 
and privileges people from other areas enjoy, and migration is partly motivated by the 
desire to live a lifestyle comparable to that of the tourists who visit the area. 
Regarding Pipariya's natural landscape, and the possibilities of employment in the 
local area, the national park has been both a curse and a—relatively small—source of 
income for the local Tharu people. While it has developed national and international 
tourism in the area, it has also kept the village of Pipariya and other surrounding villages 
under the constant threat of wild animals. Rhinos and wild elephants are especially 
problematic, as they come during the nighttime and devastate a family's entire vegetable 
garden in a matter of hours. Other Tharu communities, which were traditionally located 
within the limits of what became the national park, were forced to relocate and now 
inhabit land that is much less fertile than the fields they previously had. Relocation was 
necessary because the commission that created the park adopted a protected approach to 
biodiversity conservation. This approach implies that no human activity will develop in 
the space delimited for the national park. McLean (1999) argues that relocation due to the 
National Park was even more devastating to the Tharu community than the migration 
from the hills. Then, they were still able to inhabit lands and keep livestock that were of 
central importance to their identity and self-sufficiency. Now, they are forced to 
relinquish the land that formed the basis of their economic and cultural survival (McLean 
1999:42). This western approach to conservation, which excludes human populations, has 
had extremely negative impact on the indigenous people of the area. 
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The national park has also affected the way in which land is perceived. Until the 
1980s, the area to the south of Pipariya towards the Rapti River had cheap land, while the 
land to the north of the village was considered more expensive. There are stories about 
how in the past, while the hill migrants were moving into Chitwan, the Tharus got rid of 
the land adjacent to the Rapti River, which delimits the space of the National Park. 
Traditionally, the lands adjacent to the park were not considered the most desirable or 
expensive land, partly because of its proximity to the Rapti River, which meant that it 
could get easily flooded, and partly because of the presence of jungle animals. For 
Tharus, this was not well fitted for agriculture. Today, these are the most expensive lands 
in the area, where most hotels have been built. Some Tharus complain how their 
grandparents, focused as they were on their lives as farmers, sold the land cheaply 
without having a vision of the tourism that would develop in the area. 
The proximity to a tourist destination has made it possible for some people from 
the Tharu community to be employed in either hotels, park attractions —mainly as nature 
guides— or tourism agencies. This participation is limited, however. At the moment, and 
due to the decline in tourism caused by the April 2015 earthquake and Nepal’s current 
political situation, there was only one man from the village working at a hotel, while four 
others were on forced leave because of the lack of business. It is generally people from 
the poorer households, those who were traditionally landless, who tend to work for the 
hotels. Tharus from the elite groups do not want to work as employees in the hotels, and 
if they do, it is only while they are still young and probably unmarried. When I asked 
young men about employment prospects in the park or the adjacent tourist area, they 
would simply say that the hotels' wages are not enough. Some young men work as tourist 
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guides in the high tourism season, without really considering it a permanent or serious 
source of employment. 
Despite the fact that the national park and the tourism it attracts comprise the most 
appealing employment opportunities in the area, Tharu people in this part of Chitwan are 
not the immediate beneficiaries of tourism. Many of the hotels and tourism agencies are 
owned by Bahuns, and this particular group monopolizes the tourism industry in the area. 
There have been attempts by Tharus to create locally owned guest houses, and although 
there are a few successful ones, these are not as big and do not attract as many 
international tourists as the more modern, well-connected to tourism agencies, Bahun-
owned hotels do. Siva Chandra, a Tharu from Pipariya in his mid fifties, said in an 
interview, "In [the tourist town near Pipariya], all the hotel owners are people from 
outside. The Tharu, the people who have always lived here cannot own hotels in the 
town. We have small guest houses, and we also work in lower paying jobs in the hotels, 
but the people who get the money, are all these people from outside." Siva Chandra uses 
the term 'people from outside' (bahirako maanche) to refer to the hill migrants, in 
particular Bahuns. This reality further accentuates the social tensions between Tharus and 
Pahariyaas. 
Part 2: A typology of destinations—where do migrants want to go? 
With the national park ruled out as a reliable source of income outside of 
agriculture, the possibilities of employment for Tharu men shrink. The job market in 
Nepal is particularly unfavorable at the moment. Even those who come from privileged 
backgrounds find that, after completing their studies, it is not possible to secure a job that 
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generates a significant income for the household. Many young Nepalis are opting to leave 
the country not only for employment, but also to pursue their studies abroad. They are 
largely supported by their parents in this decision. In a conversation I had with a middle-
aged high caste Newari woman in Kathmandu, she expressed her frustration over her 
oldest daughter's fortune. Her daughter is 26 years old, and completed a Master's in 
Business Administration. After looking for a job for several months, she was finally able 
to find one as an administrative assistant at a local non-profit organization. However, the 
monthly salary is almost insignificant. As a woman, she is not expected to earn enough 
money to sustain a family; but it is frustrating that after investing so many years in her 
education, she is not able to have a substantial income. Her mother confided to me that 
she secretly hoped her daughter would be able to get a job abroad, because she did not 
think the situation in Nepal would get better any time soon. This conversation, happening 
in an urban setting, within a high-caste Newari family, with much better opportunities 
than Chitwan Tharus have, demonstrates that the desire to leave Nepal is expressed by 
people from all over the country's social landscape. 
Leaving Nepal with a study visa to Japan, Australia or if possible Europe or the 
United States is a much more desirable way to emigrate than as a laborer. It is safer, as 
there are immigration laws in these countries that protect migrants. They are also able to 
settle in these destinations, obtain permanent jobs, and remit a much larger sum of money 
than people who migrate to the Gulf or Malaysia. Several Nepalis first leave the country 
with a student visa, and are later able to find employment and naturalize in the host 
country. There are institutes in Nepal's largest cities that prepare students in basic 
Japanese skills so they are able to apply for a visa to Japan. There are many other 
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institutes that prepare students for the certification necessary to attend university in 
Australia or the United States. Walking down the bazaar areas in cities like Kathmandu, 
Bhaktapur, Pokhara, and Bharatpur, we can see plenty of billboards advertising these 
programs. This is a relatively expensive process, as the tuition cost for the institute, plus 
cost of exams, paperwork, visa and initial travel expenses equals 900,000 Nepali rupees, 
or about $8,450, without considering tuition abroad. It is also necessary to have obtained 
at least a high school diploma. Despite the cost, migrating in order to study has become 
an aspiration for many young Nepalis, aspiration that is clearly present in Pipariya. 
As shown in Figure 1, all of the Bahun households that have a member abroad 
have been able to send them to study in Australia. For Tharus, however, the reality is 
very different. Those who are currently residing in a developed country such as Australia, 
Japan, the US, or Europe have not necessarily reached there because of their educational 
qualifications. The first person to ever leave Pipariya to settle in the West was a young 
man who married an Australian anthropologist around twenty years ago. There is one 
young man who currently resides in the United States, because he won the Diversity 
Lottery this country offers. Another man, who has been living in Europe —his family 
assumes he is in Portugal— for the past six years, did so after he obtained a tourist visa to 
attend a conference in Switzerland, overstayed his visa and never returned to Nepal. In 
Pipariya, Tharus are more likely to migrate for labor to Gulf countries or Malaysia. Most 
of the young men who are currently in their twenties have not completed high school. 
They also do not have access to the large sums of money necessary to study abroad. For 
Tharus, the path to migration is more intricate, due to their lower social status as an 
indigenous group, and the relative lack of resources and access to the right networks. 
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During my second stay in Pipariya, I met Surendra and Hemraj, a father and son, 
who have followed very different migration patterns. Surendra was among the first 
people to leave Pipariya to work abroad. He spent three years in Dubai, and then 
continued working abroad in Saudi Arabia first, and currently in Qatar. He told me that 
his main motivation to migrate was to be able to send his children to good schools. 
Hemraj, his son, is currently studying for his Bachelor's degree in Business 
Administration in Bharatpur. He is one of the most educated young men in the village. 
When I talked to him in January of 2016, he was attending a Japanese language school, 
and applying for scholarships to finish his studies in Japan. 
The different paths that Surendra and Hemraj are following demonstrate that there 
is a hierarchy of places where Tharus would like to migrate. The ideal kind of migration 
is to be able to do what Pipariya's Bahuns do: migrate for educational purposes, mainly to 
Australia but also to Japan. Australia is preferred because the language of instruction is 
English, while in order to go to Japan they need to learn Japanese.  
Studying abroad, unfortunately, is not achievable for many members of the Tharu 
community. Hemraj is an exception in the community, and many of his peers consider 
him to be the smartest boy in the village. Compared to Bahuns, Pipariya's Tharus are not 
equally educated. Most people in their twenties have been able to pass the School 
Leaving Certificate (SLC), an exam taken after grade 10. Fewer of them have completed 
what in Nepal is called 'college' or '+2', two years of specialized education that follow the 
SLC. Even fewer have gone into university, although there is a university campus an hour 
away from Pipariya. The gender disparity is also enormous, and few girls have completed 
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their college exams. Bahuns of the same age, on the other hand, have all completed 
college education, and most of them also have university degrees. Despite the fact that 
Tharus are more educated now than they were twenty, or even ten years ago, they are still 
not on equal terms with Bahuns. 
When people do not have the necessary qualifications to migrate in order to study, 
labor migration is the other option. Obtaining the Green card through the United States 
Diversity Visa Lottery, or being able to work in Europe, are also preferred, but extremely 
expensive and hard to obtain. Considering these difficulties, the next most sought after 
destination is South Korea. There is a bilateral agreement in place between the Nepali 
and the South Korean government, and 3,000 Nepalis each year go work over there 
(DOFE 2014). They are all employed by the state, which also covers the cost of 
migration, and it is a very safe job that pays well. The only condition is passing a Korean 
language examination, which motivates lots of Nepalis to study Korean.  
Because there is a limited quota for Korea, the next option is individual migration 
to Gulf countries. People from Pipariya tend to go to the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The UAE is preferred because there are not such strong social 
and religious rules and employers are able to speak English. In second place come Qatar 
and Bahrain, which are similar but more conservative, and last Saudi Arabia. Tharus who 
work in Saudi Arabia have mixed opinions about it. Because there is already a network of 
Tharus working there, it becomes an appealing, more familiar destination. However, they 
are not comfortable with the many religious rules, especially the prohibition on the 
consumption of liquor. Tharus are still able to buy all kinds of alcohol, but they do so in a 
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black market that is very expensive. The cultural shock of seeing women wearing the 
burka was also mentioned by all the people who have worked in Saudi Arabia. Veils are 
not particularly uncommon for Nepalis, but the burka—a full body cloak that also covers 
the eyes—caused strong impressions among them. Lastly, the restriction of movement, 
and the fact that unmarried men are only able to access certain public spaces and during 
determined days was another regulation that made Tharus uncomfortable. 
The last place were people want to go abroad is Malaysia. Just like Saudi Arabia, 
there were some contradictory appreciations of Malaysia, because there is a large, already 
existing, network of Tharus who have migrated to this country. Tharus also feel that 
companies in Malaysia are less likely to cheat on workers, and once they arrive in the 
country they always work the job they were promised in Nepal. However, Malaysia is not 
a safe place. There are thieves on the streets, and many Tharus have been robbed or had 
their belongings stolen in this country. Roshan, who has recently returned to Pipariya 
after working in Malaysia for three years as a machine operator, complained about being 
robbed twice while walking on the street, and getting his phone and pay check taken 
away. It is this unsafe environment that places Malaysia at the bottom of the hierarchy of 
places Tharus want to go to, especially considering that being robbed is something that 
these people have probably never experienced in their home communities. If being 
abroad is not an ideal situation, then what are some of the factors that push young Tharu 
men to leave Pipariya in the first place? 
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Part 3: Push and pull factors of migration in Pipariya 
In migration studies, the movement of people outside of their places of origin can 
be explained through push and pull factors. The reasons why people migrate can be 
economic, political, cultural, and environmentally based. This section will examine some 
of the push and pull factors of migration in Pipariya, describing the causes and effects of 
each factor. 
Push factors are events or situations within the home country or society that push 
people away from their communities. In the case of Nepal in general, and Pipariya in 
particular, push factors of migration include: 1) lack of job opportunities for the growing 
population, especially young men and women in their twenties, 2) decline in food 
production and food security due to fragmentation and splitting of family land, 3) the 
positionality of Tharu people within the Nepali society as a lower status ethnic group, 
unable to access the same privileges as higher caste people, and, until recently, 4) the 
internal Maoist conflict (Jha 2014). 
As described earlier, the Tharu are considered to be an indigenous group of 
Nepal, and as such occupy a lower social position than high-caste Hindus. This makes it 
difficult for them to access certain jobs, especially government positions. At the same 
time, as more and more people become educated in the community, they aim to move out 
of the traditional subsistence farming economy, and look for jobs in the service or 
industry sectors. However, as explained, there are few opportunities in this part of 
Chitwan for young people to find work. 
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The other important push factor is the partition of land among the many families 
of the village. In Nepal, especially among high-caste hill people, it is common that family 
disputes or the death of the household head leads to land division among the sons 
(Bennett 1983:10). Although not as systematically as for hill people, this practice of land 
partition is also true of Tharu people in Pipariya. In the past, Tharus were reluctant to 
split the household, and several generations shared the same space (Müller-Böker 1999). 
Today, there is only one family in Pipariya that is still large. There are 15 people residing 
in this household, and their land amounts to almost 4 bighas (one bigha equals 0.68 
hectares, this family's total land equals 2.72 hectares). All the families in the village, 
however, are rapidly splitting. Most families have divided their land between three to five 
years ago, and as a result, families that used to own several bighas of land now only have 
access to a few katthas (one kattha equals 340 m2). Bikram, one of the young men I 
interviewed in Pipariya, believes that migration has accelerated the process of splitting 
households: "Whenever there is a small discussion, the sons decide to split. They can do 
it now because they have money from abroad, and do not need the family anymore. So to 
avoid other disputes, they split".  
The positionality of Tharus as a lower status ethnic group, the third push factor, 
has been discussed in Chapter 2. It is this perceived backwardness with respect to Bahun 
neighbors what pushes young Tharu men to migrate. Before the rapid expansion of labor 
migration to the Gulf and Malaysia, Tharu families—especially the elite—believed in 
education as the path to upward mobility. This educated status, however, has not been 
achieved at the fast pace that many of these families would have liked. As a consequence, 
many young Tharu men do not have the degrees that would allow them to obtain 
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scholarships to study abroad. In a cycle of need that repeats itself, Tharu men abandon 
their education to obtain a job abroad, with the idea that the money they make will enable 
their families to move up in Nepal's social hierarchy.  
Ultimately, considering the dire prospects of employment within Nepal even for 
highly educated people, Tharu young men migrate for labor today to ensure that their 
children will receive adequate education and be able to migrate for study in the future. 
Anisha's husband left for the United Arab Emirates a year ago. She is a young woman, 
who still lives with her in laws, and has a 4-year-old son. With tears in her eyes, she tells 
me about how hard it has been for her since her husband left, and how lonely she feels 
inside the house. She understands—and as she says this her tears dry—that they are 
making that effort to make sure that one day her own son will be able to speak English 
and leave Nepal with a better job than his dad has at the moment. 
The last push factor is the Maoist conflict. This conflict took place from 1996 to 
2006, and affected mainly the Western districts of Nepal in its initial years. Later, it 
expanded to other parts of the country, including Chitwan. Sanjay, a 35-year-old returned 
migrant who went abroad to work in Qatar in 2003 for the first time, said that the reason 
why he migrated initially was because of the danger of staying in Nepal during the 
conflict. While the conflict started in 1996, it intensified in 2001, and many places in 
southern Nepal suffered the impact. Sanjay told me that it was very difficult for him to 
find a job in Nepal during that time, and because he was a young man who was not 
interested in joining the conflict, he saw the Maoists as a threat. He migrated to Qatar in 
2003, and stayed there until 2006, when he returned for the first time. Although the 
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conflict was his initial push to migrate, after he returned he realized that there were still 
few job opportunities in his home town, and those available did not pay as well as his job 
abroad. Therefore, he decided to return to Qatar two more times. At the moment he is 
building a large, four-story house in his village, similar to the houses of Bahuns.  
Ramesh, who is 35 and worked in Malaysia from 2004 to 2009, responded to my 
question about what changes he had noticed the most in his village after returning from 
abroad by focusing on the war. "When I came back to Pipariya, there was no more 
Maoist war in Chitwan. I left before the war ended, I could not get a job near Pipariya, 
but when I returned the war was gone and my brother and I were able to start our own 
small business." Sanjay and Ramesh's stories exemplify how all the different push factors 
of migration contribute to the decision of young men to leave the country. 
Pull factors of migration, on the other hand, are positive events and situations 
abroad that attract migrants to leave their home communities. In the case of Nepal and 
Pipariya, these include: 1) the numerous employment opportunities found in developed 
economies of Gulf countries and Malaysia, 2) wages and salaries abroad, which are much 
higher than those in Nepal, 3) the fact that other members of the community are already 
working abroad, and 4) the social prestige associated with being a migrant. 
The most important pull factor is created by the opportunities abroad, and the 
amount of money that migrants can make outside of Nepal. The development of the Gulf 
country economies, driven by the oil boom of the 1970s, created thousands of jobs in the 
construction and industrial sector. These economies turned to the huge masses of low 
skilled South and South East Asian workers for labor supply. Malaysia saw a similar 
 68 
development. There are around 25 million migrant workers in Middle Eastern countries 
(Shah 2011), of whom three quarters come from Asian developing countries. It is 
estimated that these workers send home around $60 billions in remittances (HRW 2016). 
Although the payment might be low for the amount of labor they provide, it is still a large 
sum for people whose main economic activity has traditionally been subsistence farming. 
Because migration outside of the subcontinent has been taking place for over a 
decade now and it is a widespread practice, many families already have members 
working abroad. This acts as a pull factor for other young men. People tend to go to 
places where they know relatives or friends from their home villages have also been. This 
is how they get information about the kind of jobs available in certain countries or cities, 
and knowledge of what are some of the challenges they can potentially face.  
The social network of migrants helps them stay informed of the realities abroad, 
and prepare for the difficult experience of labor migration. Dinesh, a 23-year-old man 
who worked in Saudi Arabia for two years, confessed that for several months he did not 
mention to his family the kind of work he was actually doing. He was working outside, 
carrying loads for a construction company. He was embarrassed because he did not have 
an office job. When interviewing non-government organizations in Kathmandu, this kind 
of scam operated by the manpower agencies seemed to be a recurring theme. Young men 
are promised an office position, and find out once they get to their destination that the job 
is actually in the construction sector. Lately, however, men are becoming aware of that, 
thanks to the information they receive from other relatives who have already migrated, 
and who advice them about which agencies and companies are reliable. 
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While several members of the household participate in the decision to migrate, the 
migrating young men are particularly impacted by it. For them, leaving the community 
increases their social capital, as they become part of a group that has a particular prestige 
and access to improved economic possibilities. Migration enlarges their social prestige. 
They are now earning foreign money, and are therefore perceived as better off than the 
rest of the people in the village. They are also perceived to have more knowledge of the 
world outside of the village, and outside of Nepal, and they behave accordingly. The 
Brotherhood of the Retuned is one example of how the experience of migration acts as an 
agglutinating force for those migrating young men, and how they behave differently from 
the rest of the men and women from the village. 
During my first stay in Pipariya, I was able to interview four young men who had 
not already migrated but were thinking of doing so. One of them, Ram, was a 22-year-old 
man who had finished the first year of a bachelor’s degree in management. He decided to 
drop out of school and applied for a job in Saudi Arabia. He had already been offered a 
position at a Saudi dairy farm, and was expecting to hear the date of departure. He told 
me that his decision was based on the fact that even people who have a master’s degree in 
Nepal are not able to make enough money. His uncle was already working for that dairy 
farm, and recommended that he applied for the job. He expected to be able to make 
enough money to arrange his sister’s marriage and build a cement house for his family, 
and then get married too. Ram's aspirations reflect the desires and expectations of many 
young men his age. 
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Young men's lack of desire to engage in traditional agriculture affects the decision 
to migrate. As I walk through the fields of Pipariya, it is not uncommon to see mainly 
women of all ages and older men taking care of the crops and the cattle. Young men, 
even middle-aged men, are seldom seen working in the fields. Men, as actors of 
modernization, are firm defenders of the idea that Tharus should move away from 
agriculture into other sectors. Many of the middle-aged men of Pipariya have ventured 
into business, unfortunately unsuccessfully. Young people, especially those from the 
Tharu elites, have had access to higher education. Very few of them, however, have been 
able to finish their degrees and find stable jobs either in the nearby towns or in 
Kathmandu. The reality is that Tharu men have not truly been able to insert themselves in 
the economy outside of agriculture. As a result, many of Pipariya's young men after 
finishing high school do not go on into further education but remain unemployed in their 
homes. Every member of the household is expected to contribute to the family’s 
economic wellbeing. Labor migration is a way to get someone who otherwise would be 
jobless to contribute to the household income. 
Households are constantly looking to expand their assets, and employment in Gulf 
countries and Malaysia creates opportunities for these families to develop economically. 
It is the lack of job offers at home, and the difficulties these young men run into when 
looking for work that push them to migrate outside of Nepal. Therefore, Tharus 
understand this kind of migration not as an improvement of their individual living 
conditions by moving somewhere else, but as an improvement of the family and 
household conditions by enlarging the household income. 
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Part 4: Preparing to leave—the agent and the loan 
Once the decision to migrate is taken, the next step is to find a job abroad. As 
stipulated by Nepal's Foreign Employment Act of 2007, manpower agencies are in charge 
of connecting Nepali people to employers throughout the Middle East and East Asia. 
There are around 700 agencies in Nepal, most of them located in Kathmandu. How do 
people from areas outside of the Kathmandu valley, then, access manpower agents? In 
Chitwan this is relatively easy, as there are around 40 or 50 agencies in the district. Most 
of them are located in Narayangarh Bazaar, the biggest commercial town of the district. 
These agencies are known locally as overseas and are generally linked to bigger agencies 
in Kathmandu. 
Santosh, a Bahun man in his forties, is the person responsible for one of 
Narayangarh's largest agencies. His overseas, Daya Overseas Limited, has its 
headquarters in Kathmandu. He manages the regional branch in Chitwan. His overseas is 
responsible for finding jobs for lots of young Tharus. "I come from a Tharu town. I grew 
up with the Tharu people. They know me so they trust me" is his answer when I ask him 
why so many of his clients are Tharus. While social capital is important for migrants to 
connect with each other, Santosh as a manpower agent has his unique social capital, 
which allows him to attract more and more clients among the Tharu community. 
Santosh is a busy man. In the forty-five minutes I spent at his house, his phone 
rang over a dozen times. He has been in charge of the overseas for twelve years now, and 
claims to be one of the first agents to settle in the region. Daya Overseas only sends 
workers to the Gulf countries, and according to Santosh's calculations, they are able to 
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send abroad around thirty people each month. I am interested in learning how people 
from the Tharu community know about him. "It works by word of mouth" he says. 
"Sometimes we have a job opening and 'my men' go to the town and offer it to people 
they know are looking for jobs. But most times they come to us, they come to the office 
sometimes, but mainly they know one of my men or they know me, they come asking for 
a job and when we have a position that we think the person is good for, we call them 
back." It has a snowball effect. The more people from one village are able to find jobs 
through Santosh's overseas, the more likely others from the same area will also rely on 
this agent. 
The whole process, from the moment the young man approaches the agent until 
he is on a plane bound to his work destination, takes between one to two months. After 
the initial contact, the agent is in charge of finding the right job. This will depend on the 
qualifications of the worker. Some jobs require people with little educational background, 
while some others prefer people who have some level of English and a high school 
degree. To a certain extent, it is the qualifications of the migrant that will ensure him a 
good job abroad. Luck, and working with a reliable agent, will also contribute. Once the 
agent finds the right job, he gets in touch with the job seeker, and they arrange the price. I 
asked Santosh twice during our interview about the total cost of migration, but he 
avoided my question, reluctant to give me an answer. I have heard from men in Pipariya 
that agents outside of the Kathmandu valley charge workers an extra fee, which is illegal 
according to the government's regulations. His reluctance to respond made me wonder 
how much he would be charging his clients. The price the agent charges depends on the 
cost of passport, visa, plane tickets, health and government insurance, and any extra fees 
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incurred while communicating with the companies abroad, with prices varying between 
NR70,000 ($657) and NR120,000 ($1126) depending on the destination. 
Once the prospective migrant accepts the job offer, the agent arranges for an 
interview with the company. Most reliable manpower agencies in Nepal work directly 
with the employers, and set up Skype interviews between the migrant and the prospective 
employer. The language of these interviews is generally English, as almost none of the 
employers speak Nepali, and sometimes agency employees work as interpreters if the 
migrant is not fluent in English. After the interview, the company decides whether to 
accept or reject the applicant. If the applicant is accepted, the company sends a contract, 
and the overseas starts arranging all the paperwork needed. First a passport is required, in 
order to get a visa. There are few places outside of the Kathmandu valley where passports 
can be obtained, and Chitwan district is one of them. It is a forty-minute bus ride from 
Pipariya to the office in Bharatpur where prospective migrants can obtain their passports. 
After receiving it from the government officials, migrants submit them to the manpower 
agent, who is the one in charge of arranging the visa. All the paperwork and the 
communication with the hosting company is done exclusively by the agent. 
Once the passport and the visa are set, prospective migrants go for a medical 
check up, where they are examined in order to assess whether they are fit for work or not. 
Migrants are not able to bring their own certificate; they need to be examined in one of 
the facilities set up by the government to conduct the check up. The check up determines 
whether the person is physically and mentally able to work abroad. Once they pass the 
medical check up, prospective migrants need to attend a training provided by the Foreign 
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Employment Promotion Board, a government institution established in 2012 to ensure 
safer migratory processes for Nepali citizens. This training is only done in Kathmandu. 
Considering the large number of people who migrate from other regions in the country, 
especially Chitwan, I asked Santosh why his agency, or any other agency in the area, 
does not provide the training in Bharatpur. He responded that the cost of renting a venue 
and paying for the trainer to come to Chitwan would exceed the cost of each individual 
prospective migrant traveling to Kathmandu, staying there for a day to receive the 
training and returning to their homes. Migrants are responsible for covering the expenses 
of this training, and it is a compulsory step in the process. 
The training includes a five-minute video and a talk by an officer from the 
Department of Foreign Employment. The topics covered include how to travel by plane, 
how to behave at an airport and inside a plane, and what to expect on arrival at the 
foreign country. The video contains images of cities like Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha, 
Riyadh and Kuala Lumpur. It also talks about rules and regulations at the destination 
country, focusing mainly on the consumption of alcohol—extremely important for 
destinations in the Middle East where it is considered a social taboo—contact with 
foreign women, and gambling. The officer expands on the points included in the video, 
and answers questions from migrants. 
After the training, the migrant purchases insurance, which is paid directly to the 
government. The cost of this insurance is NR1,000 ($9.40). By paying this relatively 
small fee, the worker makes sure that the government will be able to help him in case of 
difficulties while working abroad, and ultimately that his family will receive 
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compensation if something were to happen to him. After all these steps are completed —
the contract, the passport, the visa, the medical check up, the insurance— the agent waits 
for a final confirmation from the company, and once the date for arrival of new workers 
is set, he purchases the plane ticket for the migrant. 
The agent becomes the link between the migrant and the outer world. Agents are 
responsible for ensuring that the job they promise the migrant, and what the migrant is 
actually doing abroad, coincides. This is not always the case, and there are many agents 
who, as my informants put it, jhutto bolne, or speak lies. These agents deceive workers, 
overcharging them for visa and flight costs, or lying about the working conditions abroad. 
Workers, as well as prospective migrants, know these facts and mistrust agents. However, 
as one of my informants told me "there is not much we can do, we need jobs and they 
have them, we can just hope they will not lie to us." Lack of certainty regarding legal 
migration, and the higher cost of it, push several Nepalis to migrate through informal 
channels. 
All migration that is not done under a legal contract with a foreign company and 
without a sponsored visa is unregulated, and all migrants who do not leave from a Nepali 
airport are considered illegal. Because of the open border with India, many Nepalis 
choose to cross the frontier, and fly out of India to their work destinations. There are 
manpower agencies in Nepal that facilitate this process. Although it is cheaper than 
migrating legally out of Nepal, the real cost is hard to estimate because there are no 
official records of this kind of migration. The Nepali government does not recognize this 
kind of migration as legal, and is unable to assist these migrants abroad. If a migrant has 
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a serious problem abroad, such as exploitation or accidents, he or she is not able to 
request help from the Nepali government in terms of subsidies or repatriation. This is 
especially problematic for some of the most destitute groups in Nepal, people who are 
unlikely to be able to afford the legal migratory channels. 
Most of the young men in Pipariya are able to migrate legally. Legal migration 
implies that the migrant has the capital to finance it. Tharus in Pipariya have, in 
comparison to other groups in Nepal, access to assets that allow them to be able to 
finance legal migration. Although unlike Bahuns, Tharus are not able to access bank 
loans due to lack of connections with bank owners, there are several microcredit entities 
around Pipariya, which provide small loans that families use to cover the costs of 
migration. These microcredit entities require only proof of citizenship and a land 
certificate to obtain a loan, and most Tharu families in Pipariya are able to provide those 
documents. They also do not require a guarantee, and do not require a minimum amount 
of land that borrowers should have in order to get a loan. 
There are two different kinds of microcredit entities in Pipariya. One is called the 
mahilaa samuha or women's group. It works solely with women, and will be explained in 
the next chapter. The other kind, which is locally known as bachaat or simply 
microcredit, is organized based on farmers' groups. The oldest one around Pipariya was 
created 40 years ago. Membership in these microcredit groups is organized around small 
groups within a village, which then report to a larger group formed by representatives 
throughout the VDC. Some of these microcredit entities offer loans that are particularly 
geared to the development of agriculture, cattle farms, or small businesses, but others 
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allow families to get loans for their own purposes. This is how families obtain loans to 
help a son or a husband migrate. These loans have an interest rate of around 13%. The 
young man commits to return the money from the loan with the salary he makes abroad. 
Depending on the kind of job the migrant is able to get, this can take from one to three 
years. 
Certain families, especially those with large amounts of land, are able to finance 
their children's migration by selling part of their fields. There is one Tharu family in 
Pipariya that recently sent their daughter to study in Japan. They sold three katthas 
(around 0.1 hectares) of their total of two bighas and ten katthas (1.62 hectares) to pay 
for part of the expenses. Having enough land and being able to sell it is a relative 
privilege, and therefore the family did not need to take a loan. This is particularly 
important considering that migration to Japan with a study visa is much more expensive 
than labor migration, and it is uncertain that this young lady would be able to work to pay 
back the loan, at least in the initial stages of migration. 
While all of the Tharu families I interviewed relied on microcredits for loans and 
financing, most of the Bahun families are able to access loans from banks. This implies 
that the amount of money Bahuns are able to borrow is much larger than what Tharus can 
request from the microcredits. Banks allow clients to take loans of several hundred 
thousand rupees, while microcredits manage much smaller sums. Tharus in Pipariya are 
aware of this difference. One of the men I interviewed, a young entrepreneur, complained 
that Bahuns generally know the people who work at the banks, because these banks are 
generally run by other high-caste hill people, and therefore they are much more likely to 
 78 
trust Bahuns and give larger loans than to Tharus. On the other hand, even those Tharus 
who are relatively big landowners never approach banks for loans. They believe that 
banks will refuse them the loan, so they approach the microcredit institutions instead. 
This partially explains why so many Bahun families are able to send their sons to study in 
Australia, despite the fact that they are not necessarily in better economic standing than 
some of their Tharu neighbors. 
The financing of migration is as important as any other part of the process. It 
pushes Tharu households to incur debts, which are generally taken under the name of the 
household head or his wife. The prospective migrant finds himself with the moral 
commitment to repay that debt. This implies that for the first year of migration at least, 
migrants and their families are not able to save any of the money sent from abroad, as 
remittances are almost in their entirety used to repay the loan. In the next chapter, we will 
see how gender plays a critical role in the financing of migration, especially when 
women's microcredits are involved. The way in which different groups in Pipariya are 
able to finance migration sheds light into the differences of social capital between Bahuns 
and Tharus in Pipariya, and how this social capital allows Bahuns to engage in a more 
profitable kind of migration. 
Loans generate debt, and remittances are the material element that allows Tharu 
families to repay these debts. Once the loan is returned, however, families can dispose of 
the remittance money in different ways. Reciprocity allows for migrants to be strong 
decision makers regarding the disposition of remittances.  Hari, who left for Malaysia in 
the early 2000s and returned to Pipariya in 2012, told me about how much the village had 
 79 
changed in the ten years he was abroad. More and more people were building cement 
houses, and there were more roads connecting everything. He has built his own cement 
house, and is now looking to expand part of it and turn it into a small shop.  
Hari confessed he was extremely happy to return. Working at a hotel first, and 
then as a security guard in Kuala Lumpur, he came to hate the city, the messiness and 
dirtiness, as well as the street violence and the risk of being mugged. Returning to 
Pipariya, for him, was returning to a clean, safe space, where he was familiar with people. 
As one of the older people I interviewed (Hari is 44 years old), he offers a less romantic 
perspective of what 'abroad' looks like than younger migrants do. He understands that 
there are few opportunities in the village, but he also appreciates the easiness of 
Pipariya's life. As someone who has completed several migration cycles and always 
returned to Pipariya, Hari provides a good example of how labor migrants never fully 
break the connection with the village, and as such help transform the experiences of those 
staying behind. Hari's—as well as other migrant workers'—perception of both "home" 
and "abroad" have been shaped by the different interpretative frames with which he has 
made sense of those experiences (Levitt 1998:230). The following chapter is concerned 
with the social aspect of remittances as conceptualized by Levitt (1998), and how the 
influx of foreign money does not only transform the local economy, but class 
relationships and gender roles as well.  
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Chapter 5: Changing the community, one rupee at a time 
There are two different sides to the coin of migration. It is not only able to 
drastically change the migrant's life; it also deeply affects the different social spheres to 
which labor migrants belong. The last chapter focused on the motivations for young 
Tharu men to leave Pipariya. While explaining this process, we learnt that earning money 
abroad to remit to their families in their villages is the main purpose of the kind of labor 
migration in which Tharus from Pipariya engage. This chapter will focus on the other 
aspect of migration, the receiving end. As mentioned before, remitting is at the core of 
the motivations to migrate. Today, through Western Union and other money remitting 
agencies, migrants are able to send money from abroad easily and fast. It takes less than a 
full day for a person abroad to go to an office, make the transaction, send the transaction 
number to their relatives at home, and have that person pick it up from either one of the 
many remitting agencies' branches in the nearby tourist town, or in the bazaar. The 
relatives will then take the money they need for immediate expenses, and put the rest of 
the money in a bank or microcredit institution account. 
The village has observed several social transformations in the last few years. 
Twenty years ago, the primary occupation of most Tharu families in Pipariya was 
farming, supplemented to varying degrees by non-farming income. For most people, land 
holdings were not sufficient to meet their yearly necessities, and even members of the 
higher classes would seek work in wage labor, outside of the agrarian economy 
(Guneratne 1994:157). Since then, Tharus' land holdings have continued shrinking. This 
has accelerated the decline in economic position of the more affluent classes, which no 
longer require the services of the landless peasants to work in the fields. In this context of 
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reduced land holdings and food insecurity, labor migration appeared as the most reliable 
opportunity to substantially increase household income. Because of the relative easiness 
of migration, more and more young men are able to find employment abroad, and Tharu 
families from all economic backgrounds are able to participate.  
Because labor migration is readily available to lots of families, the cost of 
migration and the impact of remittances can be perceived across all levels of social 
interactions. During my stay in Pipariya, I noticed how remittances have allowed for 
change in four different levels of the village's social space. The first one is the 
relationship of Tharus to other community members, especially high-caste hill migrants. 
The second one is the relationship between traditional Tharu landowner and landless 
Tharus. The third one is the relationship between male and female Tharus. The fourth and 
last one is the relationship between Tharus of the older generations, and those of the 
younger generations.  
It would take several months, probably years of ethnographic research, much 
more than I was able to do, to get to the core of how migration is shaping these four 
levels of interactions and probably many others that I failed to see. However, from my 
own research, I have identified the first level, the relationship and social tensions between 
Tharus and Bahuns, as the main motivator for labor migration. This motivation has been 
the focus of the previous chapter. The other aspects, on the other hand, seem to be present 
in the decisions people make about how to invest the remittance money. There were two 
that were particularly salient in the interviews I conducted, and in almost every 
interaction I had with people in Pipariya. The first is gender relationships, and the way 
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remittances have, to a certain extent, reinforced gender hierarchies in the village. The 
second is the Tharu traditional class structure, and how remittances have helped bridge 
the gaps between social classes. This chapter will focus on the positive and negative 
impact of remittances in these two kinds of social interactions in Pipariya 
Part 1: Reconfiguring gender roles 
Traditional gender roles and limited access to resources pervade women's 
positionality in the migration and remittance process. An estimated 12% of all Nepali 
migrants are women (CBS 2011). In Pipariya, however, there are very few women who 
have left the community for reasons other than marriage, and none of them are migrant 
workers. Female out-migration is not unheard of in Nepal, and it is in fact rather common 
among certain ethnic groups, such as the Tamang. Tharus, however, seem to be against 
the idea of women migrating for work. In conversation with me, a group of middle-aged 
men in Pipariya, declared they strongly oppose the idea of Tharu women leaving the 
village to go work like the men do. Migration has a visible impact on the village's 
demographics: while it is easy to see women of all ages, you will mostly see young boys 
or older men in Pipariya. Male out-migration has another impact on Pipariya's social life: 
it is mainly women who are now at the front of the household.  
Unfortunately, the literature on Nepali women and migration—whether migrant 
women or stay-behind women—is scarce. There have been a few studies conducted on 
how left-behind women have had to readjust and have been impacted by the migration of 
their husbands and sons (Adhikari and Hobley 2015, Maharjan et al. 2012, Kaspar 2005). 
However, these studies are all focused on hill women, and there are no studies on Tharu 
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women. This section advocates for the importance of understanding the activities women 
are in charge of in the private sphere, while at the same time discussing women's 
incursion into aspects of the public sphere due to migration. 
Nepal is a patriarchal, patrilineal society, where females are expected to stay at 
home and take care of children while males move about to fulfill their role as 
breadwinners (Bohar and Massey 2009:640). Women, secluded in the realm of the 
household, define their social and political roles within the closed, private space of the 
family. In her analysis of female land ownership in South Asia, Bina Agarwal (1994) 
conceptualizes family dynamics as a "complex matrix of relationships in which there is 
ongoing (often implicit) negotiation, subject to constraints set by gender, age, kinship, 
and tradition" (Agarwal 1994:54). As such, she considers women to be constantly 
"bargaining" their positionality within the household. Women's access to resources, and 
ownership to these resources, delimits the amount of autonomy she will have in the 
private sphere—the family—and also the public sphere—the village. 
This gendered distinction between public and private space is also true for the 
Tharu people. Ulrike Müller-Böker (1999) points out that Tharu men and women interact 
with one another more freely than the orthodox Hindu groups. She quotes Rajaure stating 
that Tharu women "are not mere shadows of their husbands, as they are in Hindu society. 
A husband tries to keep his wife happy and satisfied, otherwise she might take another 
husband or run away to her parents" (Müller-Böker 1999). However, there is no 
privileged status of Tharu women over men. A wife may eat the remains of her husband's 
meal but not vice versa, both can eat together in the same room but not from the same 
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plate, and the greeting following a long separation is performed in Hindu style, with the 
wife washing the feet of her husband and then drinking the water (Müller-Böker 
1999:65). Gender roles are still strictly delimited, and most Tharu women remain within 
the private sphere. 
Nepali society, just like any society, is in constant change. Gender roles and 
division of labor are also constantly being redefined. Some of these changes are propelled 
by migration and remittances, while others are not. While it is difficult to assess the real 
impact of migration in the changing society, I argue that in order to understand how these 
two phenomena are related, it is important to understand that for many Nepalis, migration 
is not seen as a permanent relocation outside of Nepal, but as a way to improve the 
household income. In that sense, there is little difference between a job abroad and a job 
within Nepal, with the exception of the salary someone is able to earn abroad versus 
domestically. Men, fulfilling their roles as breadwinners, go out into the society looking 
for jobs, trying to diversify the family income, at times unsuccessfully. In this process, 
they move further away from the traditional farmer role they have occupied. However, 
the land is still there, and the responsibility of working the fields falls upon those who 
stay in the household: the women. Maharjan et al. state that "[there is] a widening gender 
gap in workload as a result of migration" (2012:121). Women whose husbands are still in 
the household are more likely to receive help in their daily tasks. Those whose husbands 
have migrated must face the household workload by themselves. 
It is in this environment that remittances become key to empower or disempower 
stay-behind women. For example, regarding education, Vogel and Korinek (2012) argue 
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that there are three ways in which gender may affect the relationship between remittance 
receipt and educational investment: (1) women, especially spouses or mothers left behind 
by migrating husbands or sons, can be remittance-allocating agents in their households, 
potentially promoted to be 'managers of the purse'; (2) girls and women can be the 
consumers of remittances; and (3) women can also be the senders of remittances, 
potentially specifying particular uses (e.g., education) for the remittances they send back 
home. The authors also point out that the latter is relatively rare in Nepal, given that 
women are still underrepresented among labor migrants, and it is even more rare in the 
context of Pipariya, as Tharu women do not migrate for labor. Women have the capacity 
to manage the remittance money; the space, however, is not always provided.  
Women are relegated to specific spaces—all within the realm of the domestic, or 
private, hidden from the public eye. Interviewing one of the young leaders of the Tharu 
Welfare Society, I asked him about women's participation in this organization. He 
recognized that it is difficult to engage women in political activity, and the men in the 
Society struggle to achieve enough female representation. There is a regulation stating 
that there needs to be one-third female representation in any political organization, and 
this young leader admitted that they sometimes have to approach women they know 
individually and convince them to be part of the society; only occasionally have they had 
women themselves approach them to be part of it. This is not an issue exclusively 
affecting the Tharu people; women have historically had a small participation ration in 
partisan politics, and quotas are the policy implemented by the state to try to achieve 
higher participation, so far unsuccessfully. 
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During my second visit to Pipariya, the political landscape of Nepal in general 
and Chitwan in particular had shifted. The proclamation of the Constitution shortly after 
the May 2015 earthquake had been negatively received by most of the inhabitants of the 
Tarai. Groups like the Tharu and the Madhesis had become highly politicized in their 
attempts to get the national government to rescind the Constitution. While mainly men 
were present in the demonstrations, an event took place in the tourist area of Pipariya that 
made me question the extent to which women had become part of the political struggle of 
Tharus. A festival is celebrated every year during the last week of December in the tourist 
town near Pipariya. This festival, known as the Hatti Daura—the Elephant Run—is 
organized by the local Hotel Association, run mainly by Bahun men. It begins with a 
rally where Tharu women, dressed in traditional clothes, perform folk dances. This time, 
however, the Tharu women had decided not to participate in the event. The day of the 
rally, many women were congregated in the Tharu tol8 complaining about the unfairness 
of their having to dance, while the pahariyaas got to profit from the event. I was 
positively struck by the women's decision, admiring their involvement in the area's 
political struggles. After inquiring more about this incident, however, I learnt that it had 
been mainly a decision taken by the men at the Tharu Welfare Society, and that women 
had complied with it. 
While the role of women in breaking the traditional structure in public spaces is 
ambiguous, their presence in the private realm of the household is strong. As I walk 
around Pipariya in the dry winter months, women are visible and active at all times of the 
day. Early in the morning, as they feed the cattle, sweep the courtyard, and prepare the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  The Tharu tol is the Tharu neighborhood, located generally at the center of the Tharu village. 
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morning meal. During the day, as they wash clothes, talk to each other, make stools, 
weave carpets, or attend a meeting for the women's group. In the evening, as they prepare 
the meal for their families, or sweep the courtyard once again; and late at night as they 
talk by the fire, joined by the other members of the household. 
Changes in the resources women manage within the household due to their 
husbands and sons' migration might indicate changes in the traditional roles that women 
occupy, which could possibly be transmitted into the public sphere. Women in Pipariya 
have also become increasingly noticeable in the management of finances. The appearance 
of female microcredit groups has had a great impact on the financial capital women have 
access to. In Nepal, women’s microcredit groups are known as mahilaa samuha or 
"women's group". Sarita is a woman in her forties who has been part of the mahilaa 
samuha since she arrived in the village after marriage. She lives in a small house near the 
middle of the Tharu tol, and is an active member of three different mahilaa samuha.  
Despite being part of it for so many years, Sarita is unable to tell me how long 
these groups have been around. We ask other women around us, but nobody is sure. This 
is a difficult question, because most women in Pipariya came to the village in their late 
teens, after marrying. However, all the women seem to agree that the groups were not 
there when they first arrived, but were created around twenty years ago. Sarita explains to 
me that they meet the first day of every month, and that day all the women are supposed 
to give 50 rupees for the microcredit's fund. That day, those women who have taken loans 
also give their monthly interest back, and families who need to take new loans approach 
them with the request. Regardless of what the money is used for, or for whose benefit, it 
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must always be the woman in the household who is part of the samuha who takes the 
loan. Sarita also explains that there is more than one group in the village; there are around 
three or four, but not every household is represented in each group. However, people 
from all ethnic/caste groups are represented. I ask Sarita if it is only Tharu women who 
participate in these groups, and she says no. "The Bahun women also come, women have 
to come from all houses in the village. First we did not like to call them, we were 
ashamed because they have their Nepali language and we do not speak it well. So we 
would take turns to go to their houses and ask them to join the meeting, today it was her 
turn, next time her turn, nobody wanted to do it. But now it is fine, we are used to them 
now". 
Sarita believes that being part of these groups has taught a lot to Tharu women. 
She says: "we are not educated, many of us older ones did not go to school, so we did not 
understand money, we only spoke our language, Tharu bhaasaa. But now we understand 
money, we know the price of things, we can go to the bazaar and not be afraid or 
ashamed". What Sarita describes as empowerment is also perceived as trustworthiness by 
men in the village. Men, whose wives or mothers have taken loans from the mahilaa 
samuha, mention that there were also "men's groups" that worked just like the women's 
ones, but men did not pay the money back on time and were not serious about it, so they 
all closed down, while the women thrived. One young man used the English word 
"transparent" to describe the mahilaa samuha. These microcredit groups have not only 
had the capacity to expand women's financial capital, they have also had an impact on 
their social capital and how women are perceived in the society as reliable managers of 
the household assets. 
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Unfortunately, a positive social perception does not necessarily imply that women 
do have power to decide what should be done with the loans they have agreed to take. In 
his analysis of women microcredit entities in rural Bangladesh, Rahman (1999) quotes 
Benería and Roldán stating that microfinance may increase women’s income but this 
increased income does not imply changing women’s position in the household in terms of 
power and authority (Rahman 1999). The strongest criticism of microfinance, supported 
by Rahman, is that rural women are vulnerable to the patriarchal ideology expressed most 
obviously in prevailing social norms and intra-household gender relations (Rahman 
1999). Women are not using these loans for their own individual benefit; they are taking 
them to benefit another member of the household or the household as a whole. 
Women have used their capacity to obtain loans to ensure their sons or husbands 
are able to migrate. During my fieldwork I interviewed seventeen men who had recently 
returned from working in the Gulf countries or Malaysia. Twelve of them had financed 
their migration partially through these microcredit loans to women. Women in Pipariya 
agree to their families’ request to take out a loan to send their sons or husbands abroad; 
however, it is extremely difficult to assess whether they are willingly doing so, or 
obeying what is socially expected of them as women, as mothers, and as wives. 
While considering the vulnerable aspects of microcredits, it is crucial to 
remember that Sarita believes that participating in the mahilaa samuha has given Tharu 
women confidence to engage in different economic activities outside of the household. 
Following Agarwal's argument that resource management is a source of empowerment 
for rural women, it is also plausible that participation in microcredit entities has expanded 
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the autonomy of women both within the private and the public sphere. Obtaining loans is 
how women have a stronger participation in the migration process. This would be a 
powerful claim supporting the argument that migration is not simply the decision of the 
migrant, but rather an activity in which the entire household participates. 
The fact that women assume the burden of a loan in order to contribute to their 
sons’ or husbands’ migration, establishes a commitment between the two. Many of the 
men I interviewed said that the reason why they stayed abroad initially is to be able to 
send money that would allow their families to pay the loan they took in order to migrate. 
In chapter 3 I introduced the story of Sandeep, who was part of a group of Nepali 
migrants that protested against unfair working conditions and managed to return to 
Nepal. Upon returning to Nepal Sandeep was immediately set up by the manpower 
agency with a job in Malaysia. He confessed that the main reason why he returned abroad 
so quickly was because his wife had taken out a loan from the local mahilaa samuha, and 
they needed to start paying it back. Microcredit entities have expanded the role of stay-
behind women in the migration process. Women contribute to migration by assuming the 
responsibility of these loans, while men commit to remit money home to pay back the 
loan. 
The internal organization of the family will influence the autonomy of women, 
how much access they have to the remittance money, and how much decision-making 
power they have within the household. The ideal Hindu joint family is characterized as an 
extended household, comprising two or more generations of a patrilocal family, with the 
oldest active male as the household head (Agergaard 1999). The father’s wife, sons, 
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daughters-in-law, unmarried daughters and grandchildren form this joint family. Despite 
the fact that households are based on some kind of family and kinship relationship, 
households are subject to continuous changes (Agergaard 1999). Disputes arise, and 
sometimes the sons decide to split off from the joint household, dividing the land and 
building individual houses for their nuclear families. Tharus pride themselves in not 
splitting households as often as Bahuns do and of having more harmonious family 
relationships. In Pipariya, however, there is only one household left of considerable size, 
with a total of fifteen members, including the father, and his four sons with their 
respective wives and children all living in the same compound. When I interviewed the 
household head, he expressed pride in having such a large joint family, with no desire to 
split. On two different occasions, however, when talking to some of the young men in 
their early thirties, they recognized that lately Tharu families are splitting faster than 
before. One of them believes that labor migration plays a role; from his perspective, once 
the husband starts making money abroad, the wife will try to convince him to split from 
the household so that she can directly benefit from the remittances without having to go 
through the in-laws. Joint and split families have different members of the household as 
recipients of remittances, and there are different kinds of tensions that arise from that 
situation. 
In my interviews with migrant workers' wives, I asked about some of the 
challenges they perceived since their husbands left. Women who still live in joint 
households focused on how difficult it was for them to have a voice of their own in the 
house, and how they were asked to do the hardest work. One in particular mentioned: "It 
is very hard when your husband is not around to talk to your father in law for you, no? 
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Then it is like no one hears you." It is true that the tensions would still be there if the 
husbands’ stay home, but the women I interviewed all seemed to believe that the 
presence of the husband mitigates some of the tension. 
Women who live in split houses, and whose husbands are the household heads, 
have different challenges and experiences. They focused on the difficulties they face 
taking care of the fields, and raising their children by themselves. However, they all 
agreed that it was good for them not to have the pressure from other relatives inside the 
house. One story is particularly interesting. Sudha is a 33-year-old woman. She has one 
son aged 17, and a daughter aged 13. Her husband left for Malaysia 10 years ago. He 
returns every two years, stays for a month and then returns to work in Malaysia. A year 
before leaving for Malaysia, Sudha's husband acquired a small flourmill. After he left, 
Sudha has been in charge of running the mill. She is one of the very few women in the 
area in charge of businesses of any kind. One important thing about Sudha is that she is a 
Bahun woman, not Tharu. Bahun women are relatively more empowered than Tharu 
women, and are much more present than Tharu women in public roles. There are more 
Bahun women who work as teachers, even as accountants at local microcredits, roles that 
are beyond the reach of many Tharu women. 
Sudha’s words, however, reflect the feelings of all migrants’ wives, regardless of 
caste or ethnicity. She told me how it was difficult at the beginning to be a woman in 
charge of the business, especially when it came to hiring men for work and telling them 
what to do. However, 10 years later, Sudha is the de facto owner of the mill. Three men 
work for her, and esteem her very highly. I could appreciate the interactions between 
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Sudha and her workers while I was visiting the mill, interactions that were built on 
respect, regardless of my presence there. Sudha explained to me: "I have my own work 
and I think that is good, all the other women who are also alone should do like I do, the 
work in the fields is not a good kind of work, they should get their own things, their own 
work, and raise their kids well, do things well for their own family." Sudha feels 
independent and able to make decisions by herself, without having the intromission of the 
extended family. She is considered a strong personality in the community, and she is 
aware of this. 
Remittances impact women differently in joint or split households because there 
is jealousy from those who are also members of the household but do not receive 
remittances. The tensions between young women and their in-laws have been thoroughly 
documented by Lynn Bennett in her ethnographic fieldwork in the hills of Nepal (1983). 
Bennett states that “probably the most common reason for a woman to encourage her 
husband to separate from the joint family is the demanding presence of the sasu or 
mother-in-law” (1983). This relationship is particular to Hindu societies, and is 
sometimes also observed among the Tharu population of Pipariya. This is especially 
evident in cases where the migrant decides to send the money to his wife, despite his 
household not being split. Parents believe that they should be naturally entitled to the 
remittance money. In a conversation I had with a group of men in their 50s, I learnt that 
they consider it useless to send the money to the wife, because she would spend it on 
herself and not share it with her father and mother in law. One man even said that 
generally, when the son sends the money to his wife, she would spend it on buying new 
clothes and running away with a new boyfriend, while the son is working hard abroad. 
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When I posed the same question to a group of migrant workers' wives, their attitude was 
quite the opposite. From their perspective, they rightfully use the money for their 
children’s education and house, field, and medical expenditures, or when their in-laws get 
sick, so they felt that was an unfair accusation from the men. Who is right or wrong is not 
the question here, what matters is that there is an extra element added to the already not 
always good relationship between the daughter-in-law or buhari and the parents-in-law or 
sasu/sasura. 
While the physical absence of men is important in changing women's roles, the 
amount of money migrants are able to remit from abroad is also highly significant. When 
remittances are low, the workload of women increases. Women need to work more in the 
field and sometimes to engage in wage labor in order to feed their families while at the 
same time pay the moneylenders for the loan taken before migrating (Kaspar 2005). 
When remittances are high, women's workload diminishes, and in certain cases they are 
even able to move out of agriculture into other kinds of work. In some cases, opting out 
of agriculture is perceived as a privilege; in others it is more of a necessity because of the 
low revenue obtained from the land. Sudha, the woman we already introduced, is an 
example of families opting out of agriculture. In the case of this particular family, once 
the household split, the land owned by the parents was divided among the three sons. 
Post-partition, the plots were really small, and that is why Sudha's husband decided to 
sell the land and acquire the mill. When asked about what she does with the remittance 
money that her husband sends, Sudha talked about using part of it to run the mill, 
especially when there is a technical problem. However, she focused on being able to send 
her children to prestigious English-language private schools, because the mill already 
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provides income necessary for daily subsistence. She has also been able to expand the 
mill through the remittance money. 
Sudha's story leads to another important aspect affected by migration: the 
decision-making power that women have in their communities. Studies on stay-behind 
women in other parts of Nepal have found that after male out-migration, women are 
relatively more active in decision making, especially in agricultural decisions such as 
what crops to grow, when to hire workers, or go for wage labor themselves, renting in 
and out land, and in small sales and purchases of livestock (Maharjan et al. 2012:121). 
Women still consult their absent husbands about it, but they are the ones deciding how to 
spend the money. This freedom to decide is limited, however, and women still depend on 
their husbands or older male affinal kin to make bigger decisions (Maharjan et al. 2012). 
Some of the decisions for which women are still dependent include land purchase, the 
construction of new buildings or improvement of existing ones, purchasing large 
livestock and the selection of schools for their children. Overall, Maharjan (2012) 
concludes that stay-behind women tend to retreat to more passive roles when their 
husbands return from abroad. These conclusions match the reality of Pipariya as well, 
where most women enjoy a limited freedom while managing the remittance money; 
however, once the husband returns to the household, they retreat to the shadows of their 
traditional roles. 
As Kaspar (2005:v) states, as more and more men migrate in search of work, 
"women become de facto household heads meanwhile their husbands remain formal 
household heads." Access to remittance money by women is determined by their 
 96 
positionality within the household, particularly concerning whether the household is split 
or not. At the same time, traditional roles of women in Tharu society act as constraints 
that women need to navigate. Institutions such as women's microcredit groups allow for 
women to have access to more resources, and give them greater bargaining power within 
the household. Because this kind of labor migration is a relatively recent phenomenon in 
Pipariya, I believe more time is still needed to truly demonstrate to what extent women’s 
role have been transformed. 
Part 2: Breaching the social divide 
While certain aspects of remittances allow for upward mobility of the Tharu as a 
whole, it would be simplistic to state that all Tharus are equally impacted by labor 
migration. This is because not all Tharus have the same socio-economic status. 
Remittances, therefore, have also had a strong role in altering some of the traditional 
social hierarchies of Tharu people. To a certain extent, it could be argued that remittances 
reduce income inequality by allowing households that were traditionally poor to improve 
their livelihoods. At the same time, access to remittances is unequal, and not all 
households receive the same amount of money. 
Economists, as well as sociologists, geographers and anthropologists, have tried 
to understand the role remittances play in the development of the Global South. In the 
particular case of Nepal, Sunam and McCarthy (2016) argue that remittances have 
accomplished what international aid and development could not achieve for the Nepali 
economy. The authors imply that the large influx of foreign money that entered Nepal 
mostly during the second half of the 20th century in the form of development aid, was not 
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able to help the Nepali economy thrive, at least not to the extent that remittances have 
been able to. This is a controversial observation, given that Nepal has historically 
received, and continues to receive, large amounts of foreign aid. 
When Nepal started receiving international aid in the 1960s, the amount it 
received as percentage of its GDP was 2%. The amount of foreign aid peaked around 
1990, when it reached 15% of the country's GDP (Bhattarai 2009). In 2014, this amount 
was 4.5% of the GDP (World Bank 2016). For much of the 90s and early 00s, Nepal was 
considered a country that relied, perhaps too heavily, on foreign aid to keep its economy 
afloat. Nepal's major donors for several decades have been the United States, the United 
Kingdom, India, China, Japan and before the 1990s, the USSR. The acceptance of aid did 
not come without political implications and policy expectations from the donors (for a 
discussion of this, please refer to Khadka 1997). Each donor country tried to push its own 
political agenda forward in Nepal. At the same time, development aid promoted 
dependency by the Nepali government, and discouraged the national economy from 
specializing outside the traditional agrarian sector. 
As the influx of development money grew, its impact began to be strongly felt in 
the Nepali society. Nanda R. Shrestha (2001) tells the story of returning to his hometown 
in Kaski district after seven years of studying in the United States, and realizing how 
much the physical and social landscape had changed. Foreign aid was responsible for 
those changes: "Most of the newly acquired wealth,” he notes, “was closely tied to 
foreign monies flowing into Nepal in the form of aid and debts" (Shrestha 2001:xix). 
During the second half of the 20th century, the large influx of foreign money fueled 
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Nepal's dependence, and developed the belief that Nepal's poor, agrarian economy was 
hopeless without development aid.  
Interestingly, as the flow of foreign aid began to decline, the number of migrants 
and the amount of remittances received by Nepali families increased. Today, remittances 
account for 25% of Nepal's GDP (World Bank 2015). This indicates a change in 
dependency: from development aid to remittances, Nepal's economy has subsisted from 
the entry of foreign money into the national economy. The main difference in how 
development aid and remittances impact society, however, is based on who can directly 
benefit from each. While international aid benefits mainly the government and the higher 
castes that have access to jobs in the development sector, remittances have a more 
democratic impact. The relative easiness of migration after the implementation of the 
Employment Acts of 1985 and 2007 have made it possible for Nepalis from all 
backgrounds, regardless of caste or ethnicity, to be able to send workers abroad. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, however, there are different costs associated with the 
different kinds of migration, and not all families are able to equally afford these costs, 
and therefore, equally receive remittances. Regardless, remittances benefit a much wider 
group of Nepali families than foreign aid ever did, probably given the fact that foreign aid 
goes through lots of bureaucratic procedures before reaching the people. 
Many scholars oppose the idea that remittances bridge inequalities, at least in the 
initial stages of migration (Koechlin and Leon 2007). Ebeke and Le Goff (2009) point out 
that differences in income distribution within the originating society have a great impact 
on the inequalities produced by remittances. In other words, people from more 
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economically secure backgrounds are able to find better opportunities abroad, which 
allow them to remit larger sums of money. Bahun families in Pipariya tend to send their 
sons to study in Australia or other developed countries. After getting a bachelors degree 
abroad, their sons are able to find jobs that allow them to remit larger sums of money 
than those who left Pipariya to work in low-skilled jobs in the Gulf or Malaysia. Acharya 
and Leon-Gonzalez (2012) affirm that remittances from India are able to reduce 
inequalities in Nepal, because of the larger participation of the poor —especially Dalits, 
the untouchable castes— in the Nepal-India migration process. Remittances from Gulf 
countries are only able to reduce inequalities in areas where there is a high concentration 
of people working in these countries. According to the Center for Study of Labour and 
Migration—which is based on data from the DOFE regarding the amount of labor 
permits that have been issued to inhabitants of each district to work outside of the Indian 
subcontinent—Chitwan district, where Pipariya is located, is the tenth largest migrant 
sending district in Nepal9. The village, therefore, could respond to patterns that allow for 
remittances to reduce inequality. 
Tharus are particularly situated in Chitwan's social structure, as they belong to a 
middle group in terms of social and economic status. There are other groups in Chitwan 
with lower socio-economic status than Tharus, particularly Dalits. At the same time, and 
as I have explained before, there are other groups in Chitwan, especially the Hindu high-
castes, which occupy a much better socio-economic position regionally and nationally. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The other nine districts are, in descending order: Dhanusa, Mahottari, Jhapa, Siraha, Morang, Saptari, 
Sunsari, Nawalparasi and Tanahu.	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Besides inter-group social differences, Tharus also have a historic internal class 
hierarchy originating in the revenue collecting system designed by the Rana regime for 
the Tarai, and implemented in 1861. This system was known as the jimidaari system, and 
divided Chitwan's society into three strata based on access to and control of land 
(Guneratne 1996). The dominant class was that of the jimidaari families, which 
controlled the majority of the land and served as revenue collectors. There was a peasant 
"middle-class" known as the raiti, large households that worked land that belonged to the 
state and paid taxes to the jimidaar. These families were settled in the village, near the 
jimidaar's house. The lower class were the bahariyaa, landless peasants who moved 
every few years from village to village, supplying labor in exchange for clothes, food, 
and housing. The jimidaari system was formally abolished in 1964. Today, the jimidaar 
is essentially an honorific title given to descendants of the old jimidaar; they do not have 
control over tenants, and the title will likely go out of use in the near future. 
Space around the village is still organized based on these kinship relationships. In 
Pipariya, people from the former jimidaari lineage live at the center of the Tharu tol. 
Raiti families of different lineages all live in houses surrounding the jimidaari's house.  
Bahariyas, on the other hand, live in more peripheral areas, near the village school. This 
traditional hierarchy is also present in the amount of land these different groups own, 
although remittances are clearly changing people's access to land. 
In general, landholdings in Pipariya—as in much of Nepal—have been shrinking 
for a variety of reasons. Arjun Guneratne states in his dissertation that former raiti 
families reported owning from 30 to 40 bighas (1994:157) before the arrival of hill 
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migrants, and this number had already reduced to between 1 and 5 bighas per household, 
with 2 bighas (1.28 hectares) being the average in 1994. In a survey I conducted, most 
former raiti families own between 1 and 2.5 bighas, with only the former jimidaari 
family owning 4 bighas (2.71 hectares). Intensive settlement in Chitwan from the hills, 
and the loss of land from Tharus to rural development and to hill people are the main 
reasons behind the shrinking of landholdings (Guneratne 1994). Currently, a rapidly 
expanding population in the district has led to the further sub-division of land. As such, 
former large landowning families are much less likely to employ former bahariyaas as 
workers in their fields, putting this group in a difficult position to find employment. 
These changes in the agricultural landscape of Pipariya generate a desperate need for 
families to find a livelihood outside of agriculture. 
Villages surrounding Pipariya are also experiencing changes in the social 
landscape. There is a larger town nine kilometers northeast of Pipariya, which we will 
call Rampur. Rampur is considered to be the largest Tharu village in the area. In the 
1970s, during the internal migration of hill populations, very few Tharu landlords in this 
town sold their lands to the newcomers. Today, this is a village of around 2,000 
inhabitants, where almost everyone is Tharu. Because of its homogenous ethnic 
composition, it allows for a more interesting comparison of how the old Tharu hierarchy 
has been affected by remittances. Entering the town from the road that leads to Pipariya, 
passing by the newly built high school compound, we encounter a row of large cement 
houses. Most of these houses look fairly new, and unlike other Tharu houses, which tend 
to leave at least a few meters of separation between different household compounds, 
 102 
these houses are all built one next to the other. These are large, two-story houses, and are 
all similarly built. 
As I walked around Rampur with Mahendra, my research assistant, he pointed out 
the houses, saying that these were houses of landless people (sukumbaasi). I was 
intrigued by his use of the word, which I have only heard in the context of Kathmandu 
slum-dwellers, and asked him what kind of sukumbaasi these people were. He then used 
the word bahariyaa to refer to them, commenting how fifteen years ago this was a poor 
area of the town. Today, however many families had at least one son working in the 
Middle East, and it was bideshko paaisa (foreign money) that had allowed the families to 
build these big cement houses. Today, this is a distinct area of Rampur, with houses that 
look much more modern than the rest of the houses in the village, except for the 
jimidaar's new house.  
This physical expression of newly acquired wealth also acts as a determinant of 
social class standing. Other former raiti and jimidaari groups have also used remittance 
money to build cement houses. However, these houses are not necessarily as big as 
bahariyaas' new houses. Lower classes aim for a much more visual representation of the 
family's newfound economic stability. Mahendra, who is part of the Tharu elite, disagrees 
with these families’ use of the remittance money in the construction of a new house. In 
his opinion, remittances should be invested in education. As a member of the higher 
Tharu classes, and part of a politically engaged select group of Tharus, Mahendra 
strongly believes in education as the only way to bridge the gap between Tharus and 
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Bahuns. The Tharu elites aims to invest in education in an attempt to imitate Bahun 
migration practices. 
Regarding changes in traditional social hierarchies, something similar is 
happening in Pipariya. Looking at the map from the last chapter (Fig. 1), we can see that 
the area traditionally inhabited by bahariyaa people, located in the western part of town, 
is from where a lot of people have migrated. Bijay Mahato is an elder from Pipariya, 
whose house is located directly behind the village school. Bijay comes from a landless 
family, but has managed to buy 15 katthas of land relatively recently (around half a 
hectare). This land belonged to one of the raiti families of Pipariya, and used to be 
worked by Bijay's stepfather. The raiti family sold it to a Bahun, and Bijay continued 
working it. A few years ago, the Bahun wanted to sell land to send his son to study in 
Australia, and Bijay bought it from him. How was someone who had little access to 
capital able to buy land, raising his status from landless to landowner? Labor migration 
can explain this. 
Bijay has two sons. The eldest did not pass the School Leaving Certificate after 
completing 10 years of education. Because of that, his son decided to become a police 
officer. This was around the time the Maoist insurgency intensified in Chitwan. As the 
situation became more violent, especially for people involved with security forces, his 
son decided to run away and migrated illegally to Malaysia, where he got a job as a 
security guard. He has been working in Malaysia ever since. Five years ago Bijay's 
youngest son decided to follow in his brother's foot steps and applied for a job as a 
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security guard in Bahrain. Thanks to the money his two sons send him from abroad, Bijay 
was able to buy the land he now owns. 
Remittances, while not reducing differences completely, can generate positive 
change in social class dynamics. As migration becomes available to wider sectors of the 
population, people from less privileged backgrounds have greater opportunities to 
improve their livelihoods. As such, remittances have a democratic component that 
foreign and development aid never accomplished in Nepal. A democratized access to 
migration has allowed for different social classes within the Tharu community to improve 
their livelihoods, reducing inequalities. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The night was falling, and a chill wind forces everyone to close and tighten up our 
coats, in this cold December night. As I entered the gate for my flight out of Tribhuvan 
International Airport, in Kathmandu, I started noticing the faces of those traveling that 
night with me. European tourists, a group of workers from an international non-
government organization, old hippies. And many, many Nepali men in their twenties and 
early thirties. The older ones, confident, patiently wait for the instruction to board the 
plane. The younger ones, nervous, gather in small groups, anxiously talking to each other, 
asking questions to the flight attendants, or incessantly making phone calls. The bus picks 
us up from the gate and drops us at our plane, bounded for Abu Dhabi. I walk to my sit, 
and find myself sharing the row with five other young Nepalis, all frantically talking to 
each other. I ask one of them: "Is this your first time on a plane?" "Ho, hajur!" he replies 
with a nod, addressing me with utmost respect. "Where are you going?" I continue. 
"Saudi, hajur. I am going to start a job there in two days." While we talk, the flight 
attendants get the plane and the passengers ready to take off. One of the young men near 
me ignores the signal to turn off cellphones, and continues talking, maybe with his 
mother, maybe his father, a sibling, or a young girlfriend—all those who stay-behind as 
he leaves Nepal. 
These young men, just like all those I have met in Pipariya, are leaving Nepal, 
eager for the opportunity to provide their families a better future. As they leave, they 
create empty spaces at home, spaces that reconfigure how their family members interact 
with each other, and with other members of their local and national community. As 
Michele Gamburd so eloquently explains in the conclusion of her research in Sri Lankan 
 106 
female labor migrants, "labor migration has led to the shifts in local gender roles, caste 
hierarchies, and class relations. As individuals and families have negotiated these 
hierarchies, the power structures themselves have evolved and changed. Gender, class, 
and caste are fluid identities situated in overlapping systems of power and authority. 
People constantly use these systems and, through this use, re-create and change them" 
(2000:232). These shifts that Gamburd describes in rural Sri Lanka, are also perceived—
although with different, uniquely localized results—in the rural areas of Nepal. 
This ethnography is an attempt to sketch the complicated social relationships of 
Pipariya, and the role migration has played in altering them in the last fifteen years. 
Pipariya was far from a static society before the expansion of migration, and the different 
migratory currents that altered its social landscape demonstrate this point. The Tharu 
people, as one of several groups that inhabit this space, feel particularly determined to 
call it home. Despite this, they understand that their lands offer little economic security, 
and venture abroad in order to improve their households’ assets. In the process, 
individual migrants gain status within the society, while at the same time risking their 
health and renouncing the comforts of village life. 
Acting as a single unit, Tharu households agree that the risks are necessary in 
order to ensure upwards-social mobility. In the process, the lives of those who stay 
behind are transformed by the migrant's absence. It is the close knitted relationship of the 
household, and a sense of obligation to one another, that creates the space for 
transformation of the household. Labor migration in itself does not have the capacity to 
connect places. Places are already connected at different levels, and migrants can also 
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live in relative isolation from the host culture, as is the case of South Asian migrant 
workers in the Gulf and Malaysia. Migration, however, has the ability to generate rapid 
exchanges between societies, and allow for opportunities that were previously beyond a 
population's reach.  
Male migrants, as expected breadwinners, have the obligation to find out ways to 
generate income, and therefore their migration is a challenge personally accepted, as well 
as supported by the rest of the family. The family, however, needs to reallocate time and 
resources after the men leave. As they allocate resources, they improve their housing 
conditions, or buy land, as an statement towards the rest of the society that they are able 
now to access assets that were previously beyond their reach. As they reallocate 
resources, women find a space to manage finances, contributing to the migrant's 
migration. At the same time, women, as the main stay-behind actor, bargain traditional 
gender roles and cultural constraints as they expand their decision-making power. 
Unfortunately, there is still not enough evidence that women can maintain these newly 
acquired empowerment roles. Time will tell to what extent are women redefining their 
location in both the public and the private space of Pipariya. 
Many of the stories shared by my informants illustrate that change does not 
happen in one single direction, or over a specific period of time. Rather, social changes 
take place at a wide variety of level. Different households, with their unique 
compositions, will perceive changes differently, and will reorganize their private sphere 
in sometimes contrasting ways. Ellaborating one single explanation to the impact of 
migration is a limiting approach. However, it is important to understand certain 
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commonalities to Tharu life that unite this group as an entity in contrast to other castes 
and ethnicities that surround them. 
I acknowledge that human relationships are dynamic and constantly changing, 
and the people of Pipariya are no exception. I do not expect this momentarily reality of 
Tharus to hold as it is described in these pages. Hopefully the people of Pipariya will find 
a means of subsistence that allow for a safer employment situation, and keeps the 
community closely knit. Tharus in Pipariya are extremely proud of their cultural heritage, 
and I hope they are always able to represent this, as they insert themselves in the 
conversation of a globalized world. 
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Glossary 
 Many of the words used in this glossary and throughout this thesis are based on 
definitions by Guneratne (1994). The spelling of Nepali words in Latin alphabet, 
however, follows the conventions of the language program taught at Pitzer College in 
Nepal. 
aadivaasi Aboriginal; indigenous person 
bachaat Microcredit entity. 
bahariyaa (Th.) A servant who lives and works in his or her master’s 
home on a yearly contract. 
bahirako maanchhe Person from abroad, or outside the community. 
bahun Local Nepali term for Brahmins. 
bideshko paisaa Money from abroad. 
bigha Nepali land measurement unit, equivalent to 0.68 ha. 
brahmin A varna (caste) in Hinduism specializing as priests, 
teachers and protectors of sacred learning across 
generations. They are at the top of the caste hierarchy. 
buhari Daughter-in-law. 
Dalit "Untouchable" caste members. 
doon Inner Tarai valley. 
Gurkha Nepali soldier in the British Indian Army. 
Jana Andolan People’s Movement, a multiparty movement in 1990 
that brought an end to absolute monarchy and the 
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beginning of constitutional democracy. It also 
eliminated the Panchayat system. 
jangli Associated to the jungle, savage. 
jhutto bolne To lie. 
jimidaar A revenue collector, responsible for revenue collection 
and agricultural development in a village 
kattha Nepali land measurement unit, equivalent to 340 m2. 
koselee Gift, present. 
madheshi Groups of people who came to Nepal from Northern 
India several generations ago. 
mahilaa samuha Women's microcredit groups. 
overseas Nepali term for manpower agencies that send labor 
migrants to Arab Gulf Countries and South East Asia. 
pahaar Hill. 
pahaariyaa Someone from the hills of Nepal, mostly used to refer to 
Brahmin and Chhetri caste members. 
panchaayat Village council; the lowest administrative unit in Nepal 
from 1960 to 1990. 
pooja Ritual celebration to worship a god, or honor a person. 
raiti Landholding peasants subject to taxation. 
 111 
sasu Mother-in-law. 
sasura Father-in-law. 
School Leaving Certificate 
(SLC) 
National exam taken after completing 10 years of 
education in all schools in Nepal. 
sukumbaasi Landless person. 
taal Plate. 
Tharu bhaasaa Tharu language. 
tika A mixture of uncooked rice grains, yogurt and red 
powder placed on the forehead of someone in special or 
religious occasions, or as an expression of honor. 
tol Tharu neighborhood. 
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